forecast prepared by the Flight Advisory Service which predicted unreadable ceilings in the higher terrain behind the front, otherwise 200 to unreadable stratus clouds, improving to 700 to 1000 feet three to four hours aunreadable the frontal passage.
Captain Jones and first Officer William Thomas Repack discussed the weather situation and prepared the flight plan for the trip using, in addition to the Flight Advisory forecast,[1] the PCA forecast. This latter forecast predicted for Morgantown 4000 feet overcast, but with a lower broken to overcast layer at 600 to 800 feet, visibility variable one half to two miles, rain and showers. The above conditions were to prevail until 2200 at which time they would improve with broken ceilings of 1000 to 1200 feet. It contained, in addition, a general statement to the effect that conditions north of the front would include a broken ceiling 2000 to 2500 feet above mean sea level.
The most optimistic weather forecast available was prepared by the Weather Bureau station in Washington and contained a terminal forecast for Morgantown of 1500 feet overcast and 2 miles visibility after the frontal passage which was forecast at approximately 1430. The sequence reports for Morgantown had been consistently reporting lowering ceilings until by the time of take-off, Morgantown reported 1200 feet and 2 miles
- ↑ The investigation disclosed that the company's dispatcher at Washington was unaware of the existence of the Flight Advisory Service which had been established at Pittsburgh and at many other points throughout the country sometime previously for the express purpose of providing detailed and current weather information to pilots for the particular routes they were to fly. Although this was not directly pertinent to this accident it did indicate a lack of understanding among the various operating personnel concerned as to all of the facilities available in the panning of a flight.
