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evidence indicates that the final stage of the approach was made at a higher speed than usual. Both the Captain and First Officer testified that the First Officer was calling airspeeds during the final approach, but it could not be determined which officer was correct in his recollection regarding the speed at which the airplane crossed the boundary.
Captain Read thought during the landing that the airplane contacted the ground after passing over only one-third of the selected landing path. Actually, of course, the aircraft massed over 1935 feet of the 3350-foot path selected before it made contact. This misjudgment by Captain Read apparently resulted from approaching at too great a speed and from the limited visibility then prevailing. When the airplane did make contact and it become apparent to Captain Read that he could not stop in the area ahead of him, he used good judgment in electing not to attempt a take-off. An attempted take-off would have been extremely hazardous because of the short take-off area and the obstructions in the flight path.
An investigation of all weather services disclosed that the forecasts and weather reports made available to Trip 17 were substantially accurate. However, the landing in question was made at dusk, with visibility at the minimum, a snow cover on the ground and a light snow in the air. Under such circumstances the pilot's judgment of distances could easily be affected by the deceptive light conditions.
At the time of the accident one mile visibility was measured at the Detroit City Airport by observation of the airport boundary lights
