-3-
Samples of the cargo which was loaded in "G' compartment were tested and, although found to be capable of supporting combustion, exhibited no unusual ignition characteristics. Studies were also conducted to determine whether a light bulb in contact with a mail sack filled with similar materials could develop sufficiently high temperatures to cause iguition. From these tests and studies of histories of baggage compartment fires, it is apparent that ignition could occur in such a manner.
The "G" compartment Riddle C-héR aircraft was certificated by the FAA as a class D compartmen 2 on the basis of airflow rate tests and engineering specifications submitted by the company. However, the company, as of the data of the accident, had not installed guards to protect the compartment lights from damage by cargo as required by the approval. In addition, no procedures were in existence requiring that these lights be turned off. Further, no pro- cedure existed which required maintech personnel to check the condition of the tape used to seal the joints of the compartment. This tape 1 essential to the installation to limit the airflow through the compartment to a rate not to exceed 1,500 cu. ft./hr. An inspection of the "c" compartment of a sister ship revealed that the tape can be scuffed and pulled away from the joints by cargo movement, thus destroying its effectiveness.
inane
The artensive damage to the heavy components of the control systems, as well as other heavy structural members in the area of the rear wing spar, occurred in a very short period as a result of an intensive hydraulic fluid fire.
3/ 0171.1 Air Regulations hb 383 (d) cuss D
“Cargo and baggage compartments shall be classified as '1)" if they are so designed and constructed that a fire occurring therein will be completely confined without endangering the safety of airplane or the occupants. Complie once shall be shown with the following. (Added hb-é, March 5, 1952)
(1) Means shall be provided to exclude hazardous quantities of smoke, flames, or other noxious gases from entering into any compartment ocmpied by the crew or passengers. (Remmbered Lib-2, August 25, 1955)
(2) Ventilation and drafts shall be controlled within each caupartment so that any fire likely to occur in the compartment will not progress beyond safe limits. (Renunbered hb-Z, August 25, 1955)
NOTE: For compartments having a volume not in excess of 500 cu. ft. an airflow of not more than 1,500 cu. ft. per hour is considered acceptable. For larger cmlpartment lesser airflow may be applicable. (Added hb-b, March 5, 1952)
(3) The corrqaartment shall be complet lined with fire-resistant material. (Remmbered Ito-2, August 25, 1955
(1;) Consideration shall be given to the effect of heat within the compartment on adjacent critical parts of the airplane. (Remmbered hb—Z, August 25, 1955).“
