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From the San Francisco terminal forecast, the crew could have expected VFR weather conditions for the arrival and would not necessarily be anticipating an instrument approach.
Since the flight had 3,750 pounds of revenue freight aboard, Slick 40Z was a Part 42 operation from Albuquerque to San Francisco and not a ferry flight.
The flight to the San Francisco area was conducted in VFR weather conditions. However, as early as 1038, when the aircraft reported to the Paso Robles Flight Service Station, the flight was advised of the instrument weather conditions at San Francisco.
Following arrival at the Mt. Hamilton Intersection at 1053, the crew canceled the VFR flight plan and was given the San Francisco forecast. The flight advised it would hold in the San Jose area and maintain VFR. At no time did they inform ATC personnel of its inoperative glide slope receiver or that the flight would be dependent solely on radar advisories for glide slope information, nor was any request made for a differant type of approach.
Although on two occasions the crew of Slick 40Z was made aware of the above minimum weather existing at the Oakland International Airport, it is apparent that they intended to wait until the weather improved at San Francisco rather than land at another airport. This decision may have been influenced by the facts that San Francisco International Airport was the Slick maintenance base, and arrangements had been made to off-load the two missile motors at San Francisco International Airport.
Up to the time that the flight received clearance for an ILS approach, the air traffic services provided Slick 40Z were routine and in accordance with standard procedures.
At 1204, Slick 40Z began its final approach to runway 28R. BEcause of the low visibility, radar monitoring of the ILS approach was required by ATC procedures. This service was being provided by the San Francisco Precision Approach Radar Controller.
The crew of Slick 40Z made a request for radar advisories which was acknowledged by the local controller as "Radar advisories on localizer voice." This acknowledgement indicates that the air traffic control facility was aware of the crew's desire for radar advisories on the approach. During the approach to the middle marker, Slick 40Z was initially high on the glide slope and to the right of the localizer course, as indicated by the advisorties given the flight. At one point in the approach, the local controller advised the flight of a fog bank on the approach end of runway 28 or 28L which extended to a point where runway 1R crossed. The last advisory given the flight placed it 100 feet left of course passing the middle marker and 25 feet above the glidepath.
The advisory service provided Slick 40Z was not in accordance with the procedures for this type of an approach which prescribed that the flight "shall" be advised of the distance from the touchdown each mile on final. On this particular approach, five radar advisories should have been diven, one for each mile en route to the runway. In this case, only two radar advisories given the flight contained the distance from the touchdown point. Further, the procedures state that if during an ILS approach, the pilot fails to report the runway approach lights or runway in sight, the PAR controller shall advise the pilot that radar advisories are being terminated when the aircraft reaches the point where the azimuth safety zone lines terminate or, in this
