APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070031-4
Since 1956 the political officials of the country have endeavored to improve the loyalty and quality of leadership in the armed forces and have attempted to make service life more attractive. Polish officers were put into all billets formerly held by Soviet officers serving in the Polish forces, educational qualifications for officers and noncommissioned officers were raised, the military school system was improved, uniforms along traditional Polish lines were readopted, and the general welfare of military personnel became a greater concern to the high command. Poland currently has the most progressive military personnel policies in the Communist world. Generally, morale within the armed forces is good, though the general populace has, on occasion, viewed the services with apathy. The refusal of the armed forces to take repressive measures during the 1970-1971 workers' riots helped to enhance its image in the eyes of the public. The present leadership cadres are both proficient and loyal, and military organization, discipline, and training are at least equal to those in comparable Soviet forces. It is anticipated that Gierek, Gomulka's successor, will continue the successful policies of his predecessor.
None of the reserves of the armed forces are organized into units. In a general mobilization, new units would be formed around cadres taken from existing units, and the reserve manpower would fill out both old and new units. Each member of the reserves has a booklet on mobilization that tells him where to report in the event of mobilization. The military administrative organization maintains close contact with the population, and a covert, partial mobilization or an overt, general mobilization could be carried out rapidly.
2. Strength Trends (S)
In 1946 the total strength of the armed forces stood at about 400,000, but thereafter there was a
| Year | Ground Forces | Naval Forces | Air Forces | Total | Territorial Defense | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1946 | 225,000 | 1,000 | 5,000 | 231,000 | 169,000 | |
| 1947 | 200,000 | 6,000 | 7,000 | 213,000 | 169,000 | |
| 1948 | 180,000 | 8,000 | 7,000 | 195,000 | 150,000 | |
| 1949 | 165,000 | 8,000 | 7,000 | 180,000 | 150,000 | |
| 1950 | 165,000 | 7,000* | 7,000 | 179,000 | 75,000 | Naval Air Arm included from 1950 onward. |
| 1951 | 300,000 | 8,000 | 10,000 | 318,000 | 75,000 | |
| 1952 | 350,000 | 8,000 | 8,000 | 366,000 | 65,000 | |
| 1953 | 260,000 | 9,000 | 10,000 | 279,000 | 65,000 | |
| 1954 | 250,000 | 9,000 | 20,000 | 279,000 | 65,000 | |
| 1955 | 250,000 | 9,000 | 24,000 | 283,000 | 65,000 | |
| 1956 | 250,000 | 11,000 | 32,000 | 293,000 | 65,000 | |
| 1957 | 250,000 | 12,000 | 36,000 | 298,000 | 65,000 | |
| 1958 | 250,000 | 14,000 | 38,000 | 302,000 | 45,000 | |
| 1959 | 200,000 | 15,000 | 42,000 | 257,000 | 45,000 | |
| 1960 | 200,000 | 17,000 | 44,000 | 261,000 | 45,000 | |
| 1961 | 200,000 | 18,000 | 46,000 | 264,000 | 45,000 | |
| 1962 | 250,000* | 20,000 | 47,000 | 317,000 | 45,000 | Increase owing to Berlin crisis |
| 1963 | 225,000 | 20,000 | 47,000 | 292,000 | 45,000 | |
| 1964 | 225,000 | 18,000* | 48,000 | 291,000 | 45,000 | Naval infantry transferred to ground forces in 1964. |
| 1965 | 225,000 | 18,000 | 48,000 | 291,000 | 45,000 | |
| 1966 | 225,000 | 18,000 | 49,000 | 292,000 | 45,000 | |
| 1967 | 225,000 | 19,000 | 50,000 | 294,000 | 45,000 | |
| 1968 | 200,000 | 20,000 | 51,000 | 271,000 | 73,000 | |
| 1969 | 200,000 | 22,000 | 51,000 | 273,000 | 74,000 | |
| 1970 | 200,000 | 22,000 | 52,000 | 274,000 | 74,500 | |
| 1971 | 200,000 | 23,000 | 53,000 | 276,000 | 74,500 | |
| 1972 | 200,000 | 26,000* | 54,000 | 280,000 | 73,500 | Includes 2,600 Maritime Frontier Guard Personnel |
| 1973 | 210,000 | 26,000* | 55,000 | 291,000 | 73,500 | Includes 2,600 Maritime Frontier Guard Personnel |
5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070031-4
