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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090016-9


Home Guard (mostly men still liable for service, 18-47 years old, but who are in exempted occupations), would be deployed to protect key installations and cover mobilization. The total strength of the Home Guard is estimated at 150,000. Most of the personnel keep their small arms in their homes, and only 20 hours of training a year are required. The effectiveness of the Home Guard would be minimal at best. It is doubtful that the mobilization plan could be accomplished during an emergency. In the event that it could, the force would be poorly organized, ill-trained, and inadequately equipped. A delaying action is the best that could be expected from it, although by guerrilla activities it could harass and pin down a considerable number of occupying troops. Operationally, the Swedish army could not be expected to perform effectively without 6 months to 1 year of intensive training with experienced, trained advisers. (S)

Strength factors contributing to the effectiveness of the army include the excellent quality of military manpower and the high standard of individual and small-unit training, particularly for winter warfare and fighting over heavily forested terrain. Weaknesses are a cumbersome mobilization plan; inadequate training for technicians; lack of unit training above battalion level; lack of high-level staff experience and of combat and logistic experience of officers and enlisted men at all levels; too much emphasis on social equality, which has resulted in loose discipline; a general lack of a sense of urgency or sacrifice, which has resulted in an indifferent esprit de corps; and limited quantities of modern equipment. Small arms and much of the lighter equipment are of good quality and design, but a large percentage of the heavier equipment is obsolete. A first run production of 283 S-tanks has been completed, and these will be used to replace some of the older British-built medium-gun Centurions. The IKV-91 infantry support gun is still in the prototype stage; however, production is expected to begin in late 1972 and carry through until 1977. Both the S-tank and the IKV-91 are amphibious. Initial production of the Swedish armored personnel carrier (APC) PBV-302 was completed in late 1971, when cumulative output reached 640 units. The PBV-302 can be used in an amphibious role. The disposable Miniman recoilless anti-tank weapon has been produced at the rate of 6,000 monthly; 72 of the weapons are assigned to each rifle company. Available small arms, although not standardized, are believed to be in sufficient supply to equip a force of 600,000. The modernization program, however, is threatened by inflation, defense cuts, and equipment degradation as a result of making equipment conform to industry capability, funding or the profit motive. Pay raises for military personnel


FIGURE 7. Swedish-built S-tank mounting 105-mm gun and three 7.62-mm machineguns. The S-tank has a fording depth of 5' and is amphibious when a built-in flotation screen is raised. The S-tank has a three-man crew. (C) (picture)


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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090016-9