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3. Defense
As in the other democracies of Western Europe, the military establishment is clearly subordinate to the popularly elected civilian government. Although military officers frequently attempt to influence and mold public opinion on matters relating to defense, they have little direct influence in making national policy. Defense policy is formulated by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who is appointed by the Minister of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs Committee, consisting of the commanders of the three armed services and the Chief of the Defense Staff. Traditionally defense matters are regarded as being above narrow partisan interests. The non-Communist parties have cooperated openly in formulating defense policy, but this patten was broken in May 1972, when the Social Democrat used Communist support to push through a pared-down 5-year defense plan with all three bourgeois parties in opposition.
The main objective of defense policy is to keep Sweden's military strength at a level high enough to convince any potential aggressor that an armed attack would be extremely costly. This policy assumes that Swedish authorities would have sufficient warning to mobilize the defense forces, and that invasion would be only a part of a larger invasion of Scandinavia and the NATO countries. In this event Sweden would expect to receive aid from the NATO powers.
The government faces the difficult problem of meeting the rising costs in the politically important social welfare sector of the budget by instituting cutbacks elsewhere, with defense expenditures the most likely target. There is evidence that the government will try to hold the line in the face of rising defense costs and will avoid an actual reduction in defense expenditures. In order to provide for the procurement of modern weapons in a period of inflation and rising costs, Sweden may resort to such measures as reducing the conscription period - a cost-cutting device currently being considered by a number of other Western European countries. Savings in training would be diverted to the aircraft industry for research and development of new generation aircraft. The recent conclusion of an agreement on Berlin, the conclusion of the agreements of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, together with the marked easing of tensions in Europe, have strengthened the hand of domestic critics who oppose "unnecessary expenditures" on the military.
Sweden has one of the most elaborate civil defense systems in Western Europe, having a higher per capita expenditure for this purpose than any other non-Communist countries. Government planning assumes there will be no capitulation to the enemy and calls for the speedy evacuation of non-essential persons from likely urban target areas. Those remaining in the cities would be given refuge in large conventional shelters as well as in the reinforced basements which are required in every school, hospital, factory, office building, and apartment building. In the 14 largest cities enormous community shelters capable of accommodating over 2 million persons have been built underground, with 50 feet or more of solid rock cover. The shelters are designed to permit them to be used for storage and other purposes during peacetime and are capable of being quickly converted to shelter use in an emergency. In addition, special underground control centers have been established to assure functioning of the various government agencies under wartime conditions.
Military expenditures for 1971-1972 reached US$1.2 billion, or about 11% of the central government budget and 3.8% of the gross national product (GNP). Estimates for fiscal 1972 indicate that the proportion of funds allocated for defense purposes will decline. The following tabulation shows the percentage of the GNP budgeted for defense in selected West European countries in 1970:
| Belgium | 3.1% |
| Denmark | 2.8% |
| Germany | 3.8% |
| Netherlands | 3.9% |
| Norway | 3.9% |
| SWEDEN | 3.7% |
| United Kingdom | 5.8% |
E. Threats to government stability
1. Discontent and dissidence
Sweden's stable and open society offers few opportunities for the growth of subversive organizations capable of presenting a serious threat to the state. The absence of deep-seated social and economic grievances, universal literacy, and a standard of living second to none in Western Europe have contributed to the development of a socially and politically stable society in which all political parties except the Communists are committed to democratic principles. Nevertheless, the growing spirit of detente between
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090019-6
