APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3
The National Front, in addition to representing the parties and mass organizations, purports to represent the population as a whole and functions as the vehicle for presenting candidates for office at all levels of government. The National Front is organized on a residential basis; each apartment house or group of houses (in rural areas, even the smallest hamlet) elects a delegation to the National Front Committee for a specified locality or region. From these local committees a hierarchical structure ascends to the central controlling body called the National Committee of the National Front. The entire organization propagates the official line whenever the regime wishes to make the "popular will" apparent on questions of national significance - particularly in connection with elections.
D. National policies (U/OU)
In the early postwar years the Soviet occupation forces laid down the policy guidelines and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) acted, for the most part, as an executory agent. Soviet officials determined the breadth and scope of the reforms - social, education, agricultural, and industrial - which overturned the existing system and provided the framework for the development of a new social and political structure. In their day-to-day decisions, however, the Soviet occupation authorities appeared to be pursuing contradictory policies, wavering between harsh exploitation of German resources through confiscation and reparations and attempts to set up a viable governmental structure. The resentment and alienation resulting from these policies came to be focused on the SED.
Disregarding popular opposition, the Soviet occupation authorities and East German leaders introduced sweeping reforms which paved the way for the development of a Communist society modeled after the Soviet Union. An indigenous elite gradually emerged and Soviet control became less direct. East German ideology still proclaims that the Soviet Union is the model for socialist development, and the SED leadership has shown itself sensitive to Soviet policy and practice. Both Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker have held the position that the GDR can find its place in the sun only by close cooperation with the Soviet Union, Today the leadership commands the loyalty of a large, dedicated bureaucracy and technical intelligentsia, which increasingly identify their own interests with those of the regime and recognize the stake they have in advancing the legitimacy of the East German state by contributing to the successful implementation of government programs.
1. Domestic
The primary goals of the domestic policies pursued by the regime are to assure the perpetuation of SED control of the society and to continue the process of transforming East Germany into a viable state separate and distinct from the Federal Republic of Germany. Until recently, the major barriers to achievement of these goals have been the problem of legitimacy - the GDR was born of foreign occupation rather than domestic revolution - and the lingering desire of citizens of both Germans for reunification of their divided nation. Prior to 1961 the East German citizenry had a choice as to whether they wished to be a part of the new society that the Communist regime was molding in the part of Germany under its control, or move to West Germany which had received general recognition as the only legitimate German state. The escape route through Berlin provided the means by which the East Germans were able to "vote with their feet," as a result of which a steady stream of the nation's most highly trained citizens - technicians and professional people, including engineers, scientists, and physicians - fled to the Federal Republic of Germany.
The readily available escape route allowed the remainder of the population to take a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the SED. In fact, the general state of relations between the regime and the people was measured by the flow of refugees to West Berlin. The construction of the wall on 13 August 1961 had the immediate effect of stopping the exodus of technically skilled manpower, but there were also longer-range consequences. For the first time since the creation of the state, the regime had control over its own borders, a development that gave the entire party and governmental apparatus a measure of confidence that had previously been lacking. In addition, it was now clear to the people that they had no choice but to remain, and that in order to improve their own material well-bring they would have to come to terms with the regime and its demands.
In its initial period of development the German Democratic Republic, like other Communist states, placed great emphasis on completing large show projects, particularly in heavy industry, with the result that consumer goods industries suffered and the creation of a broad economic infrastructure was neglected. While viewing economic growth as a goal in itself, the regime has also attached great importance
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3
