APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3
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FIGURE 6. New Foreign Ministry building, East Berlin (U/OU) (photo)
on issues affecting relations with the Western powers, particularly West Berlin, and has restrained the East Germans from undertaking actions which might directly challenge the position of the three Western Allies in the divided city. Continuing Soviet control is guaranteed by the 20 Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany.
Although Soviet and East German interests have generally coincided, there is evidence of some differences between the two regimes and a certain amount of friction in their relationship. The Soviet failure to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR in the early 1960s and Khrushchev's cautious flirtation with West Germany in 1964 particularly irked Ulbricht.
More serious problems arose after 1968 when Moscow's interest in pursuing detente with the West coincided with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Ulbricht felt that Brandt's eastern policy (Ostpolitik) neglected East German interests, and he attempted to halt or at least redirect Soviet and East European initiatives toward West Germany. Ulbricht continued to maintain that an improvement in relations between the two Germanies required the Bonn government to recognize the German Democratic Republic, even though it had been evident for some time that the Soviet position on this question had become more flexible. Ulbricht's unwillingness to enter into any agreement which might downgrade East German claims to the western half of the city also created difficulties in Four-Power negotiations on a regulation of the status of Berlin. From the Soviet point of view, Ulbricht - in his prime, a master of maneuver for political gain - had become so inflexible that he could not adjust to the change in the international climate and the consequent shift in Soviet policy objectives.
Although Erich Honecker had a reputation as a hard-line dogmatist, he went a long way toward meeting Soviet demands. This was not accomplished without some Soviet prodding but, in general, Honecker has been prepared to acknowledge the regime's dependence on Moscow both politically and economically. Honecker has been responsive to Soviet interests in the area of foreign policy, as was evident in the spring of 1972 when he unilaterally took several steps which aided the passage by the West German Bundestag of the Soviet-Federal Republic treaty renouncing the use of force. The leadership had echoed nearly every nuance or shift in Soviet attitudes on a variety of issues, ranging from the need for a European Security Conference to the possibility of eventual agreement on troop reductions in Europe by the United States and the USSR. East Germany also continues to lend its wholehearted support to Moscow on such issues as Romanian nationalism, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The regime has also championed the Moscow line on issues concerning the so-called third world nations, including staunch support for the Arabs in their dispute with Israel.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3
