APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3
c. Relations with West Germany
In one sense, East Germany serves as a mere instrument of Soviet policy towards the Federal Republic of Germany, the West Berlin authorities, and the Western Allies. The range of Soviet interests is so great and the issues are so sensitive that the Soviets have not permitted the East Germans to develop a truly independent policy toward the West. Their interests broadly coincide, however, and the USSR recently has tended to allow the East Germans a longer tether on foreign policy issues than it did formerly.
The German Democratic Republic's claim to be a sovereign state dictated a basically hostile attitude toward West Germany. Nonetheless, the East Germans paid lip service to the idea of an East-West German confederation, which would include the "separate territory of West Berlin" as a first step toward re-establishing German unity. Ulbricht reaffirmed this position in his 1967 New Year's message, adding the caveat that unification is impossible until West Germany undergoes a "radical democratic revolution." Ulbricht also reiterated several of East Germany's longstanding demands in calling for agreements which would lead to confederation. The East Germans argued that the two German states should establish normal diplomatic relations, recognize existing national frontiers in Europe, renounce control of or participation in the control of nuclear weapons, and declare their readiness to participate in a nuclear-free zone in Europe, respect the independence of West Berlin, and establish a commission to examine how the Potsdam agreement had been implemented in East and West Germany.
Although they denounced the West German Government as being unrepresentative and revanchist, the East Germans constantly utilized various stratagems to induce Bonn to enter into talks at a level which could be used to bolster the GDR's claims to sovereignty. The West Germans refrained from official negotiations, limiting their contacts with the East Germans to technical discussions among representatives from such agencies as the Trusteeship Office for Interzonal Trade, which handles economic and traffic matters. Nevertheless, there were inter-ministerial contacts on technical matters such as communications and transport. Both sides also found it advantageous to use private citizens, particularly church leaders, to conduct non-official negotiations which occasionally led to government-sanctioned agreements, as in the case of the prisoner exchange agreement in 1964. In 1966 the two Germanies appeared about to initiate a high-level speaker exchange between the West German Social Democrats, headed by Willy Brandt, and leading members of the SED. The East Germans, however, became increasingly apprehensive about the course of the talks and backed out, allegedly over Bonn's reluctance to rescind a law under which East German leaders could be subject to arrest in West Germany. In the negotiations for the proposed speaker exchange, provision was made for temporary suspension of this law, but the East German regime was fearful of spontaneous popular demonstrations as well as longer range political effects if the popular Brandt and other well-known West German leaders appeared in East Germany. These fears were confirmed when Brandt and Stoph met in Erfurt in 1970, where Brandt received a tumultuous welcome.
In the closing months of the Ulbricht regime, the theme of unity of the German nation or the desirability of some form of German confederation began to receive less emphasis and was finally dropped entirely. It was replaced by a policy calling for a complete differentiation between the two states - Abergrenzung - which has been given added emphasis by the Honecker regime. Under this policy, relations between the two Germanies are to be like this between any two sovereign and independent states. East German leaders loudly and unequivocally reject Chancellor Brandt's contention that the two Germanies represent two states within one nation and that a special relationship exists between them. Honecker and his ideologists instead insist that West Germany can no longer ignore the new socialist society which has been created in East Germany, since it represents an irreversible development in the history of the German people.
Despite the Abgrenzung campaign, Honecker has taken a number of steps to ease relations between East and West Germany. Under the umbrella of the Four-Power Berlin Agreement concluded in September 1971, the East and West Germans negotiated an agreement on transit traffic to West Berlin, in addition to two agreements on exchange of territory in Berlin and travel for West Berliners to East Berlin and to East Germany. In early 1972 the East German Government initiated a General Traffic Treaty with the Federal Republic and took several steps which made the passage of Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw easier.
On 15 June 1972, the East and West German representatives opened preliminary talks on the normalization of relations through conclusion of a treaty which would establish certain general principles governing relations, while leading specific points to be
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3
