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groups other than just the working class participated. For this reason, the Communists have permitted certain political parties to remain, ostensibly to represent the interests of farmers, middle class merchants, or veterans. Another unique feature of the East German scene until quite recently was the existence of private and semiprivate enterprise. Although the contribution of both to the gross national product (GNP) steadily declined, these sectors provided a relatively important share of the market with consumer goods, and they gave the regime some flexibility in carrying out economic reforms. With the change in regime leadership in 1971 and the abandonment of many of Ulbricht's economic experiments, the decision was made in early 1972 to eliminate the private sector wherever feasibly. The argument given by the SED's ideologists in favor of this decision is that a "completed socialist society" cannot tolerate these bourgeois interests.

The working class, which in theory dominates East German society, is not a privileged class, and by and large does not identify with the Communist regime, although it does take pride in many of the recent economic achievements. East Germany was one of the few countries with an organized industrialized working force before the Communist takeover, and from the beginning the workers were divided in their loyalties between the Communists and the Social Democrats. Through ill-advised policies, the Communists succeeded in alienating whatever support they may have had among the workers during the first 5 years of Communist rule. Regime efforts to build support among the workers through such programs as education and social insurance have not disguised the fact that workers are a controlled, not a controlling, segment of East German society. In an attempt to soften this disparity, the Honecker regime has frequently pontificated on the importance of breathing life back into the stultified labor organizations and paying closer heed to the workers' wishes.

The dominant class in East German society, although its existence is not officially recognized, consists of SED party members and the cultural and managerial elite, together comprising an estimated 3% to 4% of the population. Although many of these are former workers, some possess middle or even upper class family backgrounds. The system guarantees them the usual prerogatives of an upper class society—large salaries, sometimes luxurious living accommodations, prestige—so long as they continue in favor with the Communist regime. Aware of popular unhappiness with the numerous special privileges and relatively luxurious life style enjoyed by this class, the Honecker regime has attempted to narrow the material difference between elite and mass by placing a ceiling on incomes, broadening the variety and raising the quality of consumer goods, and opening previously exclusive resorts, hotels, and stores to the public.

While membership in the SED remains a prime criterion for preferment, the SED leadership in recent years has been known to waive this requirement in its effort to obtain talent. The so-called technological elite that began emerging in 1964 with the introduction of Ulbricht's New Economic System is characterized as much by its apolitical attitude as by its ability. In the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 the regime bore down on party members, teachers, journalists, and intellectuals, all of whom came in for more careful screening concerning their ideological reliability. No mass purge was conducted, but some lower and middle echelon party and government personnel were reshuffled because of their attitude or that of members of their families towards the Czechoslovak affair. Although within the SED itself the professional revolutionary has been replaced by the more pragmatic technocrat, the regime under the present leadership has placed renewed emphasis on party loyalty as a primary asset.


3. Family and communal ties

Although strong family units have been the tradition in Germany, the Communist regime has succeeded in weakening the ties both by redefining the role of women in society and intervening in the relations between parents and children, in its drive to communize the country. Among the measures which have revolutionized the status of women and swept away the Germanic tradition that a woman's chief concerns should be "church, kitchen, and children," are the regime's repeated emphasis on equality of rights and responsibilities between men and women, the draft of nearly three-fourths of the women in the working-age bracket into the labor force, the sweeping away of restrictions on divorce and abortion, the opening of a vast number of child care centers to take care of children around the clock, and the organization of women's committees to represent this sector's interest in industry, agriculture, forestry, public administration, education, and other fields. The dominant role of the father has been further challenged by Communist indoctrination of children from preschool to the college level.

After sealing the borders with West Germany in 1961, the regime felt confident enough to embark on an era of relaxation directed at allowing youth to


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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110024-7