So in terms of any criminal investigations that might arise from whatever happens on the 6th, we would conduct those criminal investigations and the prosecutions.
The last bucket is street operations. And the DAG was very clear on this: We do not do street operations. We do not have police officers to man the streets of Washington, D.C. That's the Metro Police.
With regard to the specific facilities, like the Capitol, that's the Capitol Police. At the monuments, it's the Park Police.
We can provide reserves. If someone has a real problem, tell us, and we'll throw a few hundred FBI and ATF agents at it. But we cannot man the streets of D.C. as a regular police force, because that's not what we're trained and equipped to do.
So he is very clear that in terms of street operations, and whatever might happen on the streets of D.C., we were happy to play a supporting role, but we would not be taking a lead role in any of that.
And he explained that in, I thought, pretty clear terms to the people who were on the call, and then we moved on.
Q And were the people on the call, particularly DOD, satisfied that DOJ would be taking, as you wrote down, "We can take the lead on all of these," meaning the four buckets that you just described?
A The first three, right, that we would—DOJ would have a leading role for that, but that we would not have any leading role for street operations. Yes, everyone understood that and seemed satisfied with it.
Q At the bottom half of this, of your handwritten notes, where it says "summer," and then it has a breakdown of all of the different components. Can you explain to us who provided that information and what it means there?
A That was General Milley.
