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CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP. v. RINGER
Cite as 450 F.Supp. 59 (1978)
59

CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION and Magazine Management Co., Inc., Plaintiffs,

v.

Barbara RINGER, Register of Copyrights, and the Copyright Office of the United States, Defendants.

No. 76 Civ. 339 (WCC).

United States District Court,
S. D. New York.

March 13, 1978.


Kenyon & Kenyon Reilly Carr & Chapin, New York City, for plaintiffs; Charles R. Brainard, Stuart J. Sinder, New York City, of counsel.

Robert B. Fiske, Jr., U. S. Atty., for the Southern District of New York, New York City, for defendants; John M. O’Connor, Asst. U. S. Atty., Richard E. Glasgow, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Washington, D. C., of counsel.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CONNER, District Judge:

This action to compel the Register of Copyrights and the Copyright Office to register plaintiffs’ claims to renewal and extension of the copyright in each of a series of comic books published by plaintiffs’ predecessors, is the culmination of a ten-year struggle.

The controversy centers upon a question of first impression concerning the construction of the copyright renewal statute, 17 U.S.C. § 24,[1] specifically, whether a copyright proprietor may, in its renewal application, identify the copyrighted work as both a “periodical, cyclopedic or other composite work” and as a “work made for hire,” or whether these categories are mutually exclusive and contradictory and, if so, whether the Register has the authority to refuse registration.

There being no dispute as to the controlling facts, the action was submitted for decision on a stipulation of facts and on legal memoranda.

  1. Throughout this opinion, reference is made to the provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909, as amended, which was in effect throughout the ten-year history of this controversy and was still in effect at the time the main briefs of the parties were filed. As of January 1, 1978, a new Copyright Act became effective. However, the language of its renewal provision, Section 304, is identical with that of Section 24 of the prior Act in all of the respects discussed herein, except that the renewal fee was increased from $4.00 to $6.00.