Cite as 450 F.Supp. 59 (1978)
system, is even less convincing in view of their stated willingness to accept inconsistent assertions made in separate, concurrently filed applications provided each is accompanied by the statutory fee. The integrity of the system would seem to be compromised at least as much by requiring that the inconsistent statements be made in two separate applications, creating a hazard of concealment of the inconsistency, as by permitting both statements to be made in a single application, thereby assuring public notice of the inconsistency.
Is there an inconsistency?
On their face, the terms “composite work” and “work made for hire” would not appear to be mutually exclusive. A publication may obviously be a “composite work” in the ordinary sense that it consists of the distinguishable contributions of several authors, and at the same time a “work made for hire” in the ordinary sense that all of such contributors were employees of the publisher.
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Bryan, supra, Judge Learned Hand gave such ordinary meaning to the term “composite works”:
“The second provides for ‘composite works,’ by which we understand those to which a number of authors have contributed distinguishable parts, which they have not however ‘separately registered,’ * * *.” 123 F.2d at 699.
and to the term “work made for hire”:
“The simple meaning of the words is that when the employer has become the proprietor of the original copyright because it was made by an employee ‘for hire,’ the right of renewal goes with it, unlike an assignment. ****** “The ‘work’ intended is clearly any ‘work’ which, but for the employment, the employee could have himself copyrighted.” 123 F.2d at 700.
The Compendium of Copyright Practices, a practice manual prepared by the Copyright Office for the guidance of its examining staff, likewise gives the words “composite work” their customary meaning:
“Generally, a composite work is an original publication relating to a variety of subjects, to which a number of different authors have contributed distinguishable and separable selections.” § 11.8.3. ****** “A work by a single author, consisting of a collection of his writings, is not a composite work.” § 11.8.3.II.b.
Defendants have cited no court decision or authority on copyright law, and we are aware of none, which has concluded or even suggested that the term “composite work” should or might be interpreted narrowly to exclude publications in which some or all of the contributions were made for hire. See, e. g., Nimmer on Copyright, §§ 13.3, 14.3, 43, 68.
Nor is there anything about the context in which the terms are used in the first proviso of Section 24 which suggests that they were intended to be treated as mutually exclusive. Defendants stress the fact that the four categories of work listed in the first proviso of Section 24 are separated by the disjunctive “or.” However, it is obvious that not all of these categories are mutually exclusive; for example, where the work is created by employees of a corporation, the work could fall into both the third category, “work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licensee…”), and the fourth category, “work copyrighted by an employer for whom such work is made for hire.”
To the extent that the legislative history sheds any light on the matter, it tends to undercut defendants’ position. Although a renewal system was incorporated in the first Copyright Act of 1798, no provision was made for renewal by proprietors until 1909. In the House Report accompanying H.R. 28192, the Smoot-Currier bill, which eventually became the 1909 Copyright Act, the rationale for giving proprietors the right of renewal in certain situations was explained in this way:
