as action on other things. This has been called Voluntarism, and, in an extreme form, Behaviourism. This tendency may be carried so far as to separate action (volition) wholly from all dependence on Intellect, and make the person to be a self-regulating machine which operates automatically; and to make thought to be only a form of passive feeling—assuming feeling or consciousness to be only an occasional by-product given off by the working of the organic processes. Man is an accumulation of instincts, or habits of automatic movement without or with consciousness, acquired by the organism in adapting itself mechanically to the changes of the external world. In this way the 18th century theory, “man is a machine” is revived.
If the self exercises energy of its own in Volition, where does it come from?—But this theory of automatism cannot be seriously entertained in the face of experience. In having feelings we cognise the things which give rise to the feelings; and form ideas of things and their properties of giving rise to feelings, pleasurable or painful; and foresee future things and feelings, and form an idea of future Good; and put forth energy to produce change in the world around us which will be conducive to our good. Such a process cannot be automatic merely. Where does this energy come from? It is probable that it comes from the same source ultimately as the Energy of nature. If, therefore, we can determine the origin of this Energy which we have in ourselves, we shall be justified in extending the same explanation to the world beyond us. If we can show that the energy exercised by the self is originated by the mind in realising its own purposes, and that the highest kind of mental activity is that in which the Self reacts on the world in which it lives, and occasions changes in it which will promote its own highest good, then we shall be justified in drawing the conclusion that the energy which makes changes in nature, also, has its source in the realisation of a highest good. And if we could
