Page:Calcutta Review (1925) Vol. 16.djvu/262

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1925]
IDEALISM AND THE SELF
247

Conclusion that the Self is Idea.—It follows then that Idea is an active self-realising principle, and that the life of the Self—the whole process of organic and mental evolution—is essentially an Idea or purpose realising itself, and that the Self (organic and mental) exists in virtue of its Idea, i.e., its plan, purpose, use in the system of things; and that the energy of Volition is the Idea pressing into actuality. Idea, therefore, in the highest sense is the future operating in the present—the non-existent pressing into existence—not-being rising into being. In the Idea, the future Good and the present Want are both present, and the two together make the continuous flow of action—the élan vital or will to live—which constitutes the life of Self. And the analogy must be extended to the life of Nature. There also, action must spring from a future Good present as Idea and removing a Want. But—

Does this take away the reality of Self? This view, that the Self is Idea, appears at first to be an idle paradox. The self has been considered the type of “reality,” and, as such, it has often been explained by the analogy of objects of sense-perception, as a grain of sand or flake of flint, which seems so indestructible. Thus reality has been identified with hardness and impenetrability of things in space. But Ideas are not particles of resisting substance. Therefore the theory takes away all reality from the self.

But such inert things possess only a low kind of reality. A “real” in the highest sense is what not only maintains, but develops its own existence in interaction with other things, and thereby, realises an end and serves a purpose—i.e., a living something. Its stability is stability of purpose. It is not in filling space but in persistence of self-realisation that its reality consists—a reality of action, not of spatial passivity. What would deprive the self of reality is not the ideal theory, but that of the naturalistic school—that