prescribed rules of conduct, then, surely, we may attain a symmetry of growth and a harmony of development, but in such a development, none of the elements of our selves will go beyond the ordinary limit : we shall have intelligence, but just the usual dose of it; we shall have imagination, but not more than the average; and in the same way, we shall probably possess all that a man ought to possess, and that in due proportion; and besides, we shall act, too, just in the reasonable way that good men should act in; but assuredly, that will mean anything but greatness. An overzealous adherence to the standard of goodness, therefore, has a tendency to prevent greatness and to dwarf humanity. Society may very well get on with an army of such good men, but it cannot go forward and improve, except with the help of great men—men of outstanding ability and, therefore, men who deviate from the standard type.
In Art and Literature and manufactures and industries, it is always found that unless one is prepared to deviate from the accepted standard of production, there will be only repetitions of the old type and no novelty, no fresh production, and no improvement will be possible. Because the ancients wore a particular kind of cloth, we do not stick to that fashion; we venture to deviate and so make improvements. Because the ancients followed a custom, should we stick to it eternally? Should we not deviate and make reform possible? In the same way, because the bulk of the race follow an ideal, should genius, too, be chained to it?
Moral health, like its physical counterpart, denotes a perfectly desirable state. It implies asymmetry, a proportion and a harmony, which can never be overvalued. But at the same time, we cannot deny the right of genius to exist. It is not an avoidable luxury but a sheer necessity for society in order that it may improve.
Assuming, therefore, that genius is a case of physical and moral ill-health, one of two things has got to be done;—
