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Polish hostilities

plishment; yet the three Italian expeditions, made at long intervals, form convenient milestones for recording its progress. Nearly ten years were to elapse before he should again cross the Alps. The interval was occupied by an unceasing struggle in which Henry was able by sheer tenacity to win some success.

The enmity of the Polish duke was a constant menace. Though hostilities with Boleslav were not continuous, yet three actual wars were waged. The campaigns themselves present little of military interest. Whichever side took the offensive, the operations had generally the character of an extensive foray, in which few pitched battles were fought, and decisive results were rarely attained. Boleslav, after losing Bohemia, possessed no chief city the capture of which would have meant his ruin; and thus final victory was only possible for Henry by the seizure or destruction of Boleslav himself. The duke in turn, however successful he might be in the field, could not seriously endanger the German kingdom, though he might enlarge his border at German expense. This he sought to achieve in the region of the middle Elbe. The territory lying to the east of that river, the northern portion of which constituted the East Mark and the southern belonged to the Mark of Meissen, was the usual scene of contention and the prize waiting on its decision. Not without difficulty indeed was Boleslav prevented from winning a foothold on the west of the Elbe. In Henry's absence the jealousies of the Saxon leaders, upon whom lay the duty of defence, hindered united action. Some of them had become secret partisans of Boleslav; some were lukewarm in their service of the king. Especially those ecclesiastical magnates who felt real zeal for the Church were reluctant opponents of a prince who enjoyed the favour of the Roman See, and who had done much to further the cause of Christianity among his own people. A strange act of policy on the part of Henry increased their repugnance to serve against Boleslav. For during the Easter season of 1003 he had received at Quedlinburg envoys of the Redari and of the Lyutitzi, heathen Wendish tribes dwelling in the North Mark and had made a compact with them. None of the Wends had been more stubborn in resistance to the German domination, which they had long ago shaken off; with it had gone their compulsory Christianity. Fear of a fresh subjection and forcible conversion by the sword of Boleslav drove them to negotiate with Henry, to whom they could offer protection on his north-eastern frontier and active help in the field against the Polish duke. These advantages he secured by allowing them to retain their practical independence and still to hold to their heathen religion. The treaty did in fact prove of no small value. Yet this alliance of a Christian king with pagan tribesmen against another Christian prince gave deep offence to many of his subjects; and German warriors saw with impatience the idols of their Wendish associates borne as standards on the march to overcome a foe who held the same true faith as themselves.

Henry was not satisfied merely to regain Bohemia and to stand on the