This indirect method of proof is open to an objection of a kind which does not obtain in the case of the direct method previously mentioned. In the indirect method some auxiliary law, as for instance the law of conservation of electricity, must usually be employed in deducing the relativity postulates or essential conclusions from the new assumption which one attempts to justify by experiment. There is always the possibility that the auxiliary law is itself wrong; and consequently one's confidence in the accuracy of the relativity postulates as thus deduced can be no stronger than that in the truth of the auxiliary law. The same objection can also be raised against many conclusions which we are accustomed to accept with confidence.
To many persons it appears that the first method of proof mentioned above has been carried out successfully and satisfactorily. But if one does not share this opinion it is still legitimate to accept the theory of relativity as a working hypothesis, to be proved or disproved by future experiment. It is an historical fact, patent to every student of scientific progress, that many of our fundamental laws have been accepted just in this way. Take, for instance, the law of conservation of energy. There is no experimental demonstration of this law; and in the very nature of things it is hard to see how there could be. On the other hand, it is at variance with no known experimental fact. Moreover, it furnishes us a very valuable means of systematizing our known facts and representing them to our minds as an ordered whole. In other words, it is the most convenient hypothesis to make in the face of the phenomena which we have observed. Similarly, even if one does not believe that the theory of relativity has been conclusively demonstrated, should he not accept that theory (tentatively at least) provided it furnishes him with the most convenient means of representing external phenomena to his mind?
Finally, it should be said that every supposed proof of the theory of relativity is of such character that objections can be raised to it; likewise, every supposed disproof of the theory is in the same state. In the mean time, though we cannot accept the theory with all confidence, we can at least use its conclusions to suggest experiments which otherwise would not have been conceived. Therefore, whether true or false, the theory will be useful in the advancement of science. On this account, if on no other, it should appeal to every person interested in scientific progress.
- Indiana University.
- November, 1912.
