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sented Electors from 49 to 32 (i.e. deducts about 1-3rd); whereas the change, from 5-Member to 6-Member Districts, only changes the percentage from 16 to 14 (i.e. deducts only 1-8th). The conclusion is that the important point is to have as few single-Member, and even as few 2-Member, Districts as possible; but that, when we have got as far as to Districts returning 4 or 5 Members each, it is hardly worth while to go further.
Secondly, we see that the fewer the number of votes (down to the least possible, viz. 'one') that each Elector is allowed to give, the more equitable the result. We observe, further, that the advantage, in fairness of result, increases slowly at first and more rapidly afterwards. For instance, in Table VI, if 6 Members be assigned to a District, the change from 6 votes to 5 only changes the percentage of unrepresented Electors from 49 to 41 (i.e. deducts less than 1-6th); whereas the change from 2 votes to one changes it from 19 to 14 (i.e. deducts more than 1-4th). We observe, further, that the system of allowing each Elector as many votes as there are seats to fill produces, in every case, the same result, (the most, inequitable that it is possible to
