the natural philosophers of later-day Europe. He was familiar with the Greek science, but revolted strongly against the authority given it. So radical was his attitude that he went to wholly unjustifiable lengths in attacking the Greeks, calling them "children … prone to talking and incapable of generation." This enmity may partly explain Bacon's failure to put into practice the excellent ideas which he voiced in his epigrams, maxims, and aphorisms. He did, it is true, suggest the means whereby the natural causes of which he wrote might be discovered, but he did little investigation himself. Bacon was too near the reactionarism of the middle ages to consistently practice the inductive method of study, and as a result his work was not of lasting value.
The rebellion of Bacon in England was followed by that of Descartes in France, and Leibnitz in Germany. The latter philosopher did much to revive the teachings of Aristotle, likening the series of animals to a chain, each form representing a link. This conception, while good enough in Aristotle's time, was out of date when revived by Leibnitz, and did much to hamper a true interpretation of the evolutionary sequence. As we shall see more than once in this study, scientific ideas are not like statues or paintings, things of permanent and immutable value. An idea that was good, and valuable, a hundred years ago may be neither today, and its revival would work distinct harm to knowledge. The "faddism" against which enemies of science complain is
