reality of his arguments. He added, moreover, unanswerable reasons from the law of the case. He said, "I humbly conceive that what was done, was done in the name of the parliament of England; that what was done, was done by their power and authority; and I do humbly conceive it is my duty to offer unto you in the beginning, that this court, or any court below the High Court of Parliament, hath no jurisdiction of their actions."
Charles II.
But all argument was useless addressed to such ears. Sir Orlando Bridgman, chief baron of the exchequer, who had the chief management of the trials, told the grand jury in his charge that no authority whatever, either of a single person or of parliament, had any coercive power over the king. This man had received very different treatment under the protectorate. He had submitted to Cromwell, who had not only accepted his submission, but had allowed him privately to practice the law, and in this capacity he had acted as spy and agent for Cromwell. He continually interrupted Scott, Carew, and others, when they justified their conduct on the same ground of parliamentary sanction. The people, notwithstanding their late acclamations, could not help raising loud murmurs at these arbitrary interruptions. The prisoners defended themselves with calm intrepidity, and when Bridgman retorted on Carew that the parliament that he talked of was the commons alone, a thing without precedent, Carew replied, "there never was such a war, or such a precedent; "and he boldly upbraided Bridgman with giving evidence as a witness whilst sitting as a judge. All these were condemned to death.
The clever and facetious Harry Marten made a most ingenious and persevering defence, and extremely puzzled the commissioners. He took exception to the indictment, declaring that he was not even mentioned in it. When He was shown the name Henry Marten, he objected that that was not his name, which was Harry Marten. This was overruled, but he went on to plead that the statute of Henry
