"was as absolutely necessary to us as it was unexpected by us. All our negotiations and attempts at negotiation in Holland had only produced a greater animosity, and a more obstinate determination to continue war; and England, more than any other power, had hitherto blown the fire. Yet the now ministers of that crown now held a language totally different to that of their predecessors; and the advances which they were making were less open to any suspicion, as it was for their evident and personal interests that the war, the prop and credit of the whigs, their enemies, should finish immediately." Nor could this astute minister conceal his wonder at the unguarded manner in which this most unlooked-for concession was thrown at their heads:—"They asked," he says, "from the king no sort of engagement—no, not so much as the shadow of an engagement. Gualtier had orders to be satisfied with a simple letter of compliment, by which it would be understood that the general proposition had been favourably received in France." The letter to lord Jersey was given by the command of the delighted king of France, and verbal assurances that Louis, justly irritated at the obstinacy of the Dutch, would only treat with them through the medium of England.
It is evident that, notwithstanding all the ingenious arguments which have been advanced to vindicate the conduct of the tory ministers on this occasion, that there never was a more base and unpatriotic surrender of all the advantages won by England through the military genius of Marlborough. This great general was still in Flanders, and a very short time would have brought the news of his brilliant manœuvre by which he entered the vauntedly impregnable lines of the French, and of the conquest of Bouchain, the key to the lands of France. As it was, Louis, who never omitted the slightest occasion to hang enormous pretensions upon, was able to bring forward, with much boast, the unfortunate battle of Almanza, and the surrender of the British forces. Had the ministers been inspired by a just and honest desire of peace, they would, for the sake of the reputation and the substantial advantages of England, have at least concealed their eagerness for it, and awaited the overtures which, if they were properly informed of the condition of France, they must have known could not have been long deferred. Without seeming, on the one hand, to be weakly anxious for peace, or, on the other, displaying a stubborn disposition to repel reasonable overtures for it, they would have sought to secure the best terms for themselves and their allies. England had suffered much, though not from invasion; Germany, Holland, and Flanders had suffered more, though they had not spent so much, through the invading armies of France, and all had a just claim for compensation and redress. Louis had laid waste whole districts with fire and sword, especially where the unhappy inhabitants had been protestants, as in the case of the Palatinate; and he ought not to have been suffered to escape without being compelled to make recompence, if not in money, in territory—a demand necessary to the future peace of Europe. Any English ministers, therefore, of whatever party, ought to have stood by their allies from a principle of justice, and by their own country from both justice and patriotism. Though the whigs had originated and carried on the war, that was no motive, with honourable men, for avenging their party enmities on their country. The whigs had brought the war to a point from which able management might soon have crowned it with ample success; and the glory of that success must in a degree have remained with those who finished it well, and extorted from the enemy the proper amends. But no such honest sentiments animated the tory faction of those days. They were blinded by their party rancour to everything but crushing with disgrace and mortification their political opponents; and to do this they hastened to abandon their allies, to sweep away at a blow all the glories of Marlborough and their country—for the glory ceased when the utility ceased—and to lay up for posterity a fresh recurrence of the same insolence, aggression, and destructive domination from the same country—Providence alone, not to be defrauded of its righteous retributions, reserved to itself the execution of the merited punishment on France by avenging the nations upon her in the fearful revolution of 1789, the seeds of which were sown in the miseries and despotism entailed by the wars of Louis XIV.
So far as the English ministers were concerned, they now rushed on with all that reckless impetuosity of which wily politicians like Louis and De Torcy were sure to take every advantage. Gualtier was authorised to write to De Torcy in the name of the English ministry, requesting his most Christian majesty would communicate to them the terms on which he would feel disposed to make a general peace—just as if England and not France was at an extremity, and in a condition not to dictate, but only accept of terms. Louis was so general in his answer, that it was necessary for Gualtier to make another journey to Versailles—thus giving the idea that it was England rather than France which was all anxiety for a peace. Gualtier returned with certain propositions, but Marlborough was now driving Villars before him, and was in possession of Bouchain, and prepared to make himself master of Paris in another campaign. We were entitled to make the amplest demands, and our allies were entitled to know what they were, and to enjoy the benefit of circumstances. Our ministers continued to negotiate without the Dutch and Germans, because they meant to accept terms which they knew they would not condescend to. But the intelligence of our proceedings soon reached the Hague, and the States-General quickly demanded an explanation, and at the same time announced again, through Petikum, to De Torcy, that they were prepared to treat in co-operation with England. The English ministers were thereupon compelled to communicate the French memorial to the States-General. Lord Raby, our ambassador at the Hague, wrote, urging the necessity of keeping faith with the Dutch, who were greatly incensed at our taking measures for a peace without them, and apprising them that every letter received from France conveyed the delight of the French in the prospect of being able to sow discord amongst the allies. The States soon informed the ministers of England that they were quite prepared to go along with them in the treaty for peace, but they would insist on the conditions being ample and satisfactory. In order to convert lord Raby, our ambassador, into a devoted advocate of our disgraceful and undignified policy, Mr. St. John wrote to inform him that it was her majesty's pleasure that he
