Page:Cassell's Illustrated History of England vol 4.djvu/395

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A.D.1719.]
THE BATTLE OF VILLA FRANCA.
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their arms, but their ammunition and six days' food. At length, from the heights of Tre Fontane, they descried the camp of the Spaniards below on the plains of Villa Franca, and raised a shout of exultation at the sight, for fighting appeared infinitely preferable to their sufferings on the march. The Spaniards, though on a plain, had posted themselves in a strong position, their front defended by the steep banks of the river Alcantara, their wings by entrenchments, and their rear by the little town of Villa Franca, and rocky hills covered by armed peasants. In front of the enemy was a hill crowned by a convent of Capuchins, and on this De Lede had posted Villardarias with five battalions of his best troops. De Mercy was said to be very short-sighted, and he was by no means aware of the strength of Lede's position, and especially of the force occupying the advantageous position on the Capuchin hill. He had no friendly guides, either, to make him aware of the real dangers, for the whole population was on the Spanish side. Byng had warned him not to imagine the Spaniards weak, or easily to be defeated, because they had made a rapid retreat, and he now found this only too true. They were attacked by the troops of Villardarias as they were advancing on the town, and taken by surprise. Night came down on them before they could recover their order. The next morning, however, they advanced in their attacking columns, and there was stout fighting on both sides; but the troops of Villardarias on the hill defended that post most gallantly, and the choicest troops of the emperor were necessarily thrown forward to drive them back. As a second night was fast approaching, De Mercy put himself at the head of the attacking column and made a desperate charge, but it was in vain. After having one horse killed under him and two others disabled, he received a severe musket-wound, and was carried off the field. De Mercy, still undaunted, ordered a renewal of the attack on the following morning; but when the army was drawn up at the foot of the Capuchin hill, the officers represented the strength of the place, and the severe losses they had already received from it, and De Mercy retired. The Austrians had upwards of three thousand men killed and wounded, the Spaniards not above half so many. De Mercy then drew off his troops, in order to renew his communication with the English fleet, and prevent the march of De Lede and his army towards Messina.

The second son of admiral Byng was severely wounded in this battle, and the Austrians were in the greatest destitution of provisions. Byng got on horseback, and rode to meet the Austrians, and see provisions carried to them. He found the ground scattered with the bodies of men and horses, and the wounded left lying on the spot where they had fallen with their ammunition and bread set beside them. Other poor wretches were endeavouring to crawl down to the sea-side by the help of their wives. His own son was in danger of death from want of necessary attendance; and the general's own wound was only dressed by his valet. The different officers were upbraiding one another, each declaring that, had his opinion been followed, the battle of Villa Franca would have been a complete victory. Byng endeavoured to show them that there was no use in looking back, they must be united and look forward; and he undertook to persuade the emperor and the king of Sardinia to send six thousand troops destined to drive the Spaniards from the island of Sardinia—to their aid. He made a journey immediately to Naples for that purpose, obtained his object after much difficulty, and completed the benefit by supplying their deficiency of cannon and ammunition out of his own fleet. On the voyage he was seized with an attack of fever, but he put back in all haste, and on the 28th of July came to anchor at Faro Point again, near Messina. That place was assaulted with fresh vigour, and compelled to open its gates on the 8th of August. But the strong citadel still held out, and, as it was clear that it could never be taken without heavier and more cannon, and without the better supply of the besieging army with all manner of necessaries, Byng made another voyage to Naples, and after much expostulation, and even menacing to withdraw the English fleet, he had the pleasure of once more reaching Messina with a tolerable quantity of artillery, ammunition, and stores, and the six thousand men originally destined for Sardinia. On the 19th of October the citadel of Messina surrendered.

Under the able advice and indefatigable assistance of Byng, De Mercy advanced to the strong fortress of Trapani, and in the summer of 1719 De Mercy mustered before it seventeen thousand foot and horse. He had left garrisons in Messina, Melazzo, and other places, and he soon reduced De Lede to such extremities that he entered into negotiations with De Mercy for the evacuation of Palermo and of all Sicily, on condition that the Spanish army should be allowed a free passage to Barcelona, or some other Spanish port in the Mediterranean. The Austrians were very ready to accede to this, which would have left Sicily in their entire possession; but Byng protested that not a man of that army should quit the island till a peace took place, as it would be immediately employed against England or against France in the war with Spain then raging. It was then proposed that the Spaniards should retire into Castro Giovanni, in the interior, or some other defensible position, and that a truce of six weeks should be granted in order for each party to consult their respective courts. These negotiations, however, were broken off in consequence of advice from Madrid; hostilities went on, and the Austrians, by the exercise of a little vigour, might have taken Palermo, and have finished the war in the island.

But by this time the failure of the great plans of Alberoni had produced their effect in Spain. That country was become dreadfully tired of the war. It had received nothing but disasters and humiliations instead of the proud triumphs which Alberoni had promised it. He himself was become convinced by woful experience that his proud spirit had soared far beyond the power and resources of Spain. He had himself snatched at the opportunity afforded by the little gleam of success—the victory of Villa Franca—to propose terms of peace. They were terms which the allies would have accepted at the moment when Stanhope visited Spain, and was even ready to surrender Gibraltar. But the time for these had gone by for ever. Alberoni dispatched his countryman, the marquis Scotti, to Paris, with the message that Spain was desirous to appoint the States-General as mediators betwixt herself and the allied powers; that she was ready to surrender Sicily and Sardina on condition that