PANPSYCHISM
446
PANT^NUS
Panpsychism i.Grcck jrcir, all ; \ti'X'i, soul) is a
philosophical theory which holds that everything in
the universe, the inorganic world as well as the or-
ganic, has some degree of consciousness. It is closely
related to the theory of hylozoism, which teaches that
all matter is endowed with life. As synonymous
with hylozoism must be regarded the word panhio-
tism, which was coined by Paul Carus to distinguish
his theory from the panpsychism of Hiickel ("Mo-
nist", l,S92-93, III, 23-4-57). Between panp.sy-
chism and hylozoism there is no sharp distinction,
because the ancient hylozoists not only regarded the
spirits of the material universe and plant world as
alive, but also as more or less conscious. The Re-
naissance witnessed a revival of the ancient hylozo-
ism. The Italian philosophers of nature and the
alchemists speculated about the spirits that were
present in all things and the "feelings" and ".striv-
ings" of the "principles" of nature. The monadism
of Leibniz is e\-idently panpsychistic. All things are
made up of monads. Every monad is conscious and
mirrors intellectually in itself the entire universe.
One monad differs from another only in the clearness
with which thi.s mental representation is expressed.
Apart from these early movements there is the modern scliool of panpsychism, during the develop- ment of which the word itself was coined. It began with Fechner (1801-87) and received a new impetus from D;uuiiiian iihilosophy in England and meta- physical sprriilatidn in America.
The paniisyihi^m of Fechner and later German writers is most closely connected with the Renais- sance revival of hylozoism. Both Fechner and Lotze have much in common with the mystical speculations of Paracelsus and van Helmont. To Fechner every- thing is animated; the earth is truly our mother, and a living mother at that. The panpsychism of Lotze (1S17-81) arises as a dreamy speculation, rather than a coldly-reasoned conclusion. " Has one half of crea- tion, that which we comprise under the name of the material world, no function whatever save that of serving the other half, the realm of mind, and are we not justified in longing to find the lustre of sense in that also whence we always derive it?" (Micro- cosmos, I, Book III, ch. iv, p. 353.) By making the atom unextended Lotze thought that he had removed the last objection to his panpsychism. Of a simi- lar type is the panpsychism of Paulsen, and not far removed are the speculations of Hackel on the pleasures and pains of the elements. With G. Hey- mans panpsychism appears as a reasoned conclusion from a metaphysical consideration of the relation be- tween body and mind.
In England panpsychism was advocated by Wil- liam Kingdon Clifford as early as January, 1878 (Mind, III, 57-67). He arrived at the theory as a corollary from the doctrine of evolution. Consciou.s- ncss exists in man; man is evolved from inorganic matter; therefore inorganic matter has in it the ele- ments of consciousness. This conclusion was then extended to the assertion that "the universe consists entirely of mind stuff". As his forerunners in this conception Clifford mentioned Kant and Ilackel — ■ and e.specially Wundt — of whom he wrote: "the first st.atement of the doctrine in its true connexion that I know of is by Wundt" (Lectures and Essays, II, 73).
In America as early as 1885, Dr. Morton Prince advocated the theory of panpsychism, though not under that name. He looked upon his theory as a vindication of materialism, arguing that if mat- ter is psychical in its nature and mind is to be interpreted as the resultant of these mental forces of nature, such an interpretation must be mate- rialistic; for "as long as anything is the resultant of the forces of nature it belongs to material- ism" (The Nature of Mind, 1.52). His pan- psychism was in reahty an illegitimate conversion of
the proposition: "all conscidus jirncesses are physical
changes" to "all iihy.-^ical rhariL^i's arc cniiscicius pro-
cesses". This inference was ,su|ipleiiiente(l by hints
at the evolutionary argument of Clil'ford. While the
panpsychism of Clifford and Prince w;us nioie or less
em])irical, tliat of Prof. C. A. Strong is more pro-
nouncedly metaphysical; it deals with the iiroblem of
interaction between body and mind. Prof. Strong
proposes to .solve it by eliminating the cs.sential dis-
tinction between body and soul, in holding that matter
itself is psychical nitlier than physical in its nature.
His work, "Why the Mind Has a Body" (New York,
1903) called forth a li\cly discussion of this theory.
The first article of the eighteenth question in the first part of the "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas is entitled: "Is every thing in nature alive?" It is a discussion of the theory of hylozoism and tells us also the position of the great scholastic on the question of panpsychism. St. Thomas decides that the test of hfe is to be sought in the possession of those charac- teristics that are proper to beings which are most evidently alive. These characteristics he embraces under what he terms the power of spontaneous move- ment. By this he does not mean the mere capability of moving about from place to place, but any spontaneous tendency towards any kind of change (qufECumque se agunl ad mnlum vel opcrationem aliqunm). As exam- ples of such motion he mentions the tendency of a thing from a less to a more perfect state (growth), and the sensations and understanding which constitute the activity of animals that have already acquired their full development. The question then becomes one of fact. Are there any things in nature that do not manifest the power of spontaneous movement, i. e. growth or the activity of sensory and intellectual life? Yes. There are things which have no spontaneous activity of their own and do not move except by an impulse from without, and these things are lifeless or dead. We may see analogies in them to li^■ing things, but they can never be said to live, except we are speaking jjoetically and by way of metaphor. St. Thomas therefore rejects hylozoism and panpsychism.
The only serious arguments in favor of panpsychism are: the evolutionary one put forward by Clifford, and the metaphysical reasoning of Prof. Strong. But until there is evidence to show that the chemical elements manifest some kind of mental process, we have no right to say that they do, no matter how much it would aid any theory of evolution, or how easy it might make our metaphysical explanation of the re- lation between body and mind.
St. Thomas .\qt-in-ab. Summa Throlcnirn, I, Q. xiii, a. 1; Baw- DEK, Th. Vn,,^i,^,:„'lt-r r--;rlirnl\„ P'i!,-. Ifrriew, XIII (1904),
29S-:tr' 'I' /■ - ' ■ ' /■'■' ■'• "1 in The Monist,
III (Is'ij I , 1 ; I ,,,,/,' . , / Essays, II; Body
and .1//' ,' III / ' , ' I I 1 -. i I HEM, On the Nature
of Tlui,.,x-u,-tl„i„.-,.h. I ■.' ■ I .1,., 1,^;.>); Fechneh, Zend Avesta (iJrd ed., 2 vul>.. I ' : ■, i' nii; Flouknoy, Sur le pan- psychisme in Archives - , ' .IV (1904-0.';). 129-44;
HXcKEL, T/ieRWi^eo/f/.^ ( , , , . I ■.n. Ion, 1900) ; Our Monism in The Monist, II (1891-:).',, J-.1-M.. llLf^wuB, ZurParallelismus- frage in Zeitschrift /Or Psuchiduaic, XVII (1.S9.8). (>2-10S; Lotze, MicTocosmus, tr. Hamilton and Jones, I (Edinburgh, 1881), bk. Ill, iv; Paulsen. Introduction to Philosoph,/. tr. Thilly (New York, 1895), bk. I, i. § 5. 87-11 1 ; Ppivrr, rhr Nature of Mind and the Human Automatism (P'l' ■ ! '■-' ■ ■ !-^',); The Identifica- tion of Mind and Matter in I'l / ,111 (1904), 444-51; Sthonq, Why the Mind Has a /I , . . . .^ ^.iIlc, 1903); Idem, Qurlques considerations sur le iiain>.^i^h,..inL jii Arch, de psychoL, IV (1904-5), 145-54.
Thomas V. Moore.
Pantasnus, head of the Catechetical School of Alex.andria about 180 (Eusebius, "Hist, ecd.", \, x), still .alive in 193 (Eusebius, "Chron." Abr., 2210). As he was succeeded by Clement who left Alexandria about 203, the probable date of his (h'ath would lie about 200. He was trained in the .Stoic philosophy; as a Christian missionary, he reached India (probably South Arabia), and found there Christians po.ssessing the Gospel of St. Matthew in Hebrew, which they had received from St. Bartholomew. All this is given by
