ROSMINI
195
ROSMINI
from various countries. The publication of Rosmini's
"Trattato della coscienza morale" (Milan, 1839) led
to a sharp controversy. Against Rosmini were writers
like Melia, Passaglia, Rozaven, Antonio Ballerini, all
members of the Society of Jesus, in which Rozaven
held the office of assistant to the general. On the
defensive, along with Rosmini, were L. Ea.staldi, Pes-
talozza, Pagamini. For fifteen years the wordy war
was protracted, with a truce from 1843 to 1846, due
to an injunction of Gregory XVI enjoining perpetual
silence on both sides. Pius IX, who succeeded
Gregory in 1846, showed himself favourable to the
institute, and various new foundations in England
attested its vitality. In 1848 Rosmini published
(Milan) his ' ' Costituzione secondo la giustizia socia,le ' '
and "Cinque piaghe della chiesa"; the latter against
Josephism, especially in the matter of Austrian epis-
copal appointments in Northern
Italy. In August of the same
year, he was sent to Rome by
King Charles Albert of Picnl-
mont to enlist the pope on the
side of Italy as against Austria.
Pius IX appointed him one of
the consultors to deliberate on
the definability of the doctrine
of the Immaculate Conception,
and at the outbreak of the rev-
olution asked Rosmini to share
his exile at Gaeta. Antonelli's
influence, however, prevailed
and Rosmini left Gaeta, 19 Juno,
1849. His works, "Costitu-
zione" and "Cinque piaghe",
were condemned in August, a
sentence which he unhesitat-
ingly accepted. A further at-
tack was made on him in the
"Postille" and the "Lettere di
un prete Bolognese" (1848).
Pius IX (1850) referred the
"Postille" to the Congregation
of the Index, which rejected
it as false. In view of other charges the pope ordered an examination of all Rosmini's works. The decision, rendered 3 July, 18.")4, was that all the works be dismissed (es.se diniiUcnda) , that the investigation
human intelligence, thus terminating in its object, is
intuition — an attitude rather than an activity, in
which the mind pronounces no judgment on what
is known, but merely receives the communication
of the intelligible object. All our concepts, when
analyzed, reveal being (somethingness) as their es-
sential constituent; or, conversely, human con-
cepts are nothing but determinations more or less
complex of the simple and elementary notion of
being. This fundamental idea is indeterminate and
general, conveying to the intellect no knowledge of
particular things, but simply manifesting itself as the
essence of being. Our abstraction does not produce
it, but merely discovers it already present in thought.
Being, as it appears within man's experience, has two
modes, each governed by its owm conditions and laws,
each with well-defined attributes, diverse, but not
contradictory. Manifesting it-
self to the mind as the intel-
ligible object, not exerting any
stimulus upon the intellect, but
simply illuminating it, this is
being in its ideal mode. As it
acts or is acted upon in feeling,
modifying the human subject
in sensation, constituting the
sentient principle in action and
passion, this is being in its real
mode. The former is essen-
tially objective, simple, and one
— uni\'(Msal, nccc^ssary, immuta-
ble, eternal; the latter is sub-
jective and, in our world, con-
tiiificnt, particular, temporal,
manifold, and almost infinitely
varied in aspect. Ideal being
is not God, but we may call it,
says Rosmini, an appurtenance
of God, and even Divine, for
its characteristics are not those
of created finite things, and its
ultimate source must be in God.
If thought had in it no element
implied nothing disparaging to the author, to the
institute founded by him, or to his exceptional serv-
ices to the Church, and that to prevent any renewal
and dissemination of charges and strife, silence was
for the third time imposed on both parties. Within
a year after this decision Rosmini died. His body
reposes in the Church of the Santissimo Crocifisso
built by him at Stresa. (See Rosminians.)
Anon., La Vila di Antonio Rosmini (Turin, 1897), the standard life, written by a priest of the Institute of Charity; Anon., Piccola Vita di Antonio Rosmini (Casaie, 1897); Delia Missione a Roma di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, negli Anni 1848-49 (Turin, 1881) ; Epistolario completo di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (Casaie, Turin, 1887-94); Paoli, Memorie della vita di Antonio Rosmini- Serbati (Turin, 1880-84); Antonio Rosmini e la sua prosapia (Rovereto, 1880); Life of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, ed. Lock- hart (London, 1886); The Life of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, tr. from tlie Italian of Paqani (London, 1907).
George Cormack.
The Rosminian System. — According to Rosmini, philosophy is "the science of the ultimate reasons or grounds of human knowledge". The philosopher at the outset must answer the questions: What is knowledge? What is thought? Can we be certain of what we know? Rosmini's answer is given in his ideology and logic. Intellect, he holds, is essentially different from sense; thought is objective, sensation is subjective. The term of the intellectual act is seen in such a way that the seer, at the moment, is conscious neither of himself nor of any relation with himself as seeing. The primal and essential act of
Antonio Rosmini-Serbati
Frmii a painting by F. Ilayi'Z
transccntling the contingent and finite, all knowledge of the ab.solute and infinite would be inexplicable, and truth, uncertain and variable, would exist only in name.
To explain our knowledge of particular real en- tities, Rosmini says that our knowledge of realities reduces itself to a judgment whereby we predicate existence of what is felt by us. Real entities act upon man's senses, and he immediately recognizes them as particular activities of that essence of being already manifested under another mode in intuition. Be- cause of its simplicity, the human ego, or subject- principle, is constrained to bring together and collate its feeling and its knowledge of being, and thus it perceives being energizing in the production of feel- ing. This act of the human subject whereby it cognizes real entities, Rosmini calls reason. By sense we are introduced to realities, but we could not know them as beings unless we already possessed the idea of being. This is given to our mind prior to all perception or individual cognition; it is not ac- quired by any act of thought, but is implanted in us by the Creator from the beginning of our existence: it is innate, and constitutes for us the light of reason. Furthermore, it is the very form of the human in- telligence, a form not multiple, but one — not sub- jective, but objective — i. e., not a quality or attitude or component of the human subject, but distinct from it and superior to it, existing in an absolute mode and called the form of the mind because, in manifesting itself to man, it draws forth and creates, so to speak, the act of his intelligence.
Logic, says Rosmini, is "the science of the art of reasoning". The scope of reasoning is certainty,
