Syria, while the fourth son of Antiochus VIII, Demetrius III Eucerus, was elevated to the rank of king in Damascus by Ptolemy Soter II of Egypt. Antiochus X was finally overcome by the brothers, Philip and Demetrius. Concerning his death we have conflicting reports. According to Appian he was first completely ousted by Tigranes (see below), although he seems to have asserted himself in a portion of Syria. Failing in his design of reconquering Judea, Demetrius endeavoured to supplant his brother Philip, besieging him in Bercea, but was surrounded by the Parthians whom Philip had summoned to his aid, and forced to surrender. He died at the Court of the Parthian king. Philip now marched on Antiochia, secured possession of the city, and thenceforth held sway over Syria (about 88). In Coele-Syria and Damascus, however, appeared a new pretender in his youngest brother, Antiochus XII Dionysus, who made him.self king of these parts, but later fell in a campaign against the Nabataeans (about 84). Meanwhile, King Tigranes of Armenia appeared from the north, and in 83 suc- ceeded in possessing himself of the kingdom. After overcoming Tigranes in 69, Lucullus granted the realm to the son of Antiochus X, Antiochus XIII AsiATicus, the last of the Seleucids. In 64 Pompey made Syria a Roman province, and Antiochus XIII was murdered a short time afterwards.
Genealogt of the Seleucids Seleucus I Nicator, d. 281
Antiochus I Soter, d. 261 Antiochus II Theos, d. 246 Seleucus II Calhnicus, d. 226
ileucus III Ceraunus, d. 224 Antiochus III the Great, d. 187
Seleucus IV Philopator, d. 17.5 Antiochus IV Epiphanes, d. 164 Demetrius I Soter, d. 150 Antiochus V Eupator, d. 162 Demetrius II Nicator, d. 125 Antiochus VII Sidetes, d. 129
Seleucus, V, d. 12.5. Antiochus Antiochus IX Cyzicenus, d. 95
VIII Grjijus, d. 96 . ■ * ,
Antiochus X Eusebes
, * ^
Antiochus XIII Asiaticus
Seleucus VI, Antiochus XI, Philip, Demetrius III, Antiochus XII
Flathe, Gesch. Macedonienn, II (Leipzig, 1834); Holm, Oriechenlands Gesch., IV (Berlin, 1894); Niese Gesch. der griech. u. maced. Staateii .teit der Schlacht bei Charonx (3 parts, Gotha, 1893-1903); Kuhn, Beitrage zur Gesch. der Seleuciden (programme of Altkirch in Alsace, 1891); Bevan, The House of Seleucus (2 vols., London, 1€02). Concerning the relations of the Seleucids with the Jews, cf. SchCrer, Gesch. des jild. Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi, I (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1903), 166 sqq.
Franz ScHtJHLEiN. Self Abandonment. See Quietism.
Self-Defence. — Ethically the subject of self- defence regards the right of a private person to employ force against any one who unjustly attacks his life or person, his property or good name. While differing among themselves on some of the more subtle and less practical points comprised in this topic, our moralists may be said to be unanimous on the main principles and their appli ation regarding the right of self-defence. The teaching may be sum- marized as follows:
I. Defence of life and person. — Everyone has the right to defend his life against the attacks of an unjust aggressor. For this end he may employ what- ever force is necessary and even take the life of an unjust assailant. As bodily integrity is included in the good of life, it may be defended in the same way as life itself. It must be observed, however, that no more injury may be inflicted on the assailant than is necessary to defeat his purpose. If, for example, he can be driven off by a call fur help or by inflicting a slight wound on him, he may not lawfully be slain. Again the unjust attack must be actually begun, at least morally speaking, not merely planned or intended
for some future time or occasion. Generally speaking one is not bound to preserve one's own life at the ex- pense of the assailant's; one may, out of charity, fore- go one's right in the matter. Sometimes, however, one may be bound to defend one's own life to the ut- most on account of one's duty of state or other ob- ligations. The life of another person may be defended on the same conditions by us as our own. For since each person has the right to defend his life unjustly attacked, what he can lawfully do through his own efforts he may also do through the agency of others. Sometimes, too, charity, natural affection, or official duty imposes the obligation of defending others. A father ought, for example, to defend the lives of hia children; a husband, his wife; and all ought to defend the life of one whose death would be a serious loss to the community. Soldiers, policemen, and private guards hired for that purpose are bound in justice to safeguard the lives of those entrusted to them.
II. Defence of property.— It is lawful to de- fend one's material goods even at the expense of the aggressor's life; for neither justice nor charity require that one should sacrifice possessions, even though they be of less value than human life in order to preserve the life of a man who wantonly exposes it in order to do an injustice. Here, however, we must recall the principle that in extreme necessity every man has a right to appropriate whatever is necessary to preserve his life. The starving man who snatches a meal is not an unjust aggressor; consequently it is not lawful to use force against him. Again, the property which may be defended at the expense of the aggressor's life must be of considerable value; for charity forbids that in order to protect ourselves from a trivial loss we should deprive our neighbour of his life. Thefts or robberies, however, of small values are to be considered not in their individual, but in their cumulative, aspect. A thief may be slain in the act of carrying away stolen property provided that it cannot be recovered from him by any other means: if, for example, he can be made to abandon his spoil through fright, then it would not be lawful to shoot him. If he has carried the goods away to safety he cannot then be killed in order to recover them; but the owner may endeavor to take them from him, and if the thief resists with violence he may be killed in self-defence.
III. Honour. — Since it is lawful to take life in the legitimate defence of one's material goods, it is evi- dently also lawful to do so in defence of chastity which is a good of a much higher order. With regard to honour or reputation, it is not lawful to kill one to prevent an insult or an attack upon our reputation which we believe he intends, or threatens. Nor may we take a life to avenge an insult already offered. This proceeding would not be defence of our honour or reputation, but revenge. Besides, in the general estimation honour and reputation may be sufficiently protected without taking the life of the offender.
NoLDiN, Summa Theologiae Moralis, II (Innsbruck, 1908), 352-6; De occisione injusH aggressoris; Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I (St. Louis, 1910), iii, tr. 2; Zigliara, Summa Phil- osophica. III, I, iii; St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. Ixvii, a. 7; Billuakt, Cursus Theologim: in II-II St. Thorns,
d. X, a. V. James J. Fox.
Saigas y Carrasco, Jose, poet and novelist, b. at Lorca, Murcia, Spain, 1824; d. at Madrid, 5 Feb., 1882, he received his early training at the Seminary of San Fulgencio; his family being in straitened circumstances, he was obliged to cut short his studies in order to contribute to its support. Going to Madrid, he there occupied minor Govern- ment positions, and engaged in journalism. .A.s a staunch Conservative he assailed the Liberals in the articles which he wrote for the periodical "El Padre Cobos" and other newspapers. He acted as secretary for Martinez Campos when the latter was Prime Minister. The Spanish Academy made him