TOLERATION
764
TOLERATION
is nothing else than the expression of personal unbehef
and lack of rehgious convictions. A person who is
tolerant in the domain of dogma resembles the bota-
nist who cultivates in his experimental beds both edible
plants and poisonous herbs as alike valuable growths,
while a person intolerant of error maj- be compared to
a market-gardener, who allows only edible plants to
grow, and eradicates noxious weeds. Just as vice
posse.sses no real right to existence, whatever tolera-
tion may be shown to the vicious person, so also re-
ligious error can lay no just claim to forbearance and
indulgence, even though the erring person may merit
the greatest affection and esteem. There is, of
course, a psychological freedom both to sin and to err,
but this Uberty is not equivalent to an inherent right
to sin or to err in religion. The "freedom of thought"
claimed by free-thinkers is really vitiated by an in-
ternal contradiction, since the intellect is bound by
the laws of thought and must in many cases yield to
the force of evidence. But if by freedom of thought
we are to understand the personal right of the indi-
vidual to form on all questions such internal convic-
tions as he may judge right, this ethical freedom also
has its hmits, since the inner spiritual hfe is at all
events subject to conscience and to the moral order of
the universe, and is, therefore, bound by ethical obh-
gations which no man may disregard. The so-called
"freedom of belief", which asserts the right of each
person to believe what he pleases, is open to the same
criticism. For, if the psychological liberty to accept
the wildest phantasies and the most foolish stories is
an undeniable prerogative of the human soul, ethical
freedom and the ethical right to freedom of belief are
nevertheless conditioned by the presumption that a
person will spurn all false religions and cling solely to
that which he has recognized as alone true and conse-
quently alone legitimate. This obligation was justly
emphasized by Leo XIII in his Encyclical "Immortale
Dei" of 1 November, 1SS.5: "Officium est maximum
amplecti et animo et moribus religionem, nee quam
quisque maluerit, sed quam Deus jusserit quamque
certis minimeque dubitandis indiciis unam ex omni-
bus veram esse constiterit" (The gravest obhgation
requires the acceptance and practice, not of the
religion which one may choose, but of that which
God prescribes and which is known by certain and
indubitable marks to be the only true one). (Cf. Den-
zinger, "Enchiridion", 9th ed., Freiburg, 1900, n.
1701.) The mere description of this kind of toler-
ance shows that its opposite, i. e. theoretical dogmatic
intolerance, cannot be a vice. For it is essentially
nothing else than the expression of the objective intol-
erance of truth towards error. In the domain of sci-
ence and of faith alike, truth is the standard, the aim,
and the guide of all investigation; but love of truth
and truthfulness forbid every honourable investigator
to countenance error or falsehood. It, therefore, fol-
lows that weU-considered opposition to actual or sup-
posed error, in whatever domain, is simply the antag-
onism between truth and falsehood translated into
personal conviction; as impersonal adversaries, truth
and error are as bitterly opposed to each other as yes
and no, and consequently, in accordance with the law
of contradiction, they can tolerate no mean between
them. This theoretical dogmatic intolerance — so
often misunderstood, so often confounded with other
kinds of intolerance, and as a result unjustly com-
bated — is claimed by everj' scholar, philosopher,
theologian, artist, and statesman as an incontestable
right, and is unhesitatingly accepted by everyone in
daily intercourse.
(2) Practical civic tolerance consists in the personal esteem and love which we are bound to show towards the erring person, even though we condemn or combat his error. The motive for this difference of attitude is to he sought in the ethical commandment of love for all men, which Christianity has raised to the higher
ideal of charity or love of neighbour for the sake of
God. One of the most beautiful outgrowths of this
charity is shown in the correct Christian attitude tow-
ards the heterodox. This relation, rooted solely in
pure love, is commonly meant when one speaks of
"religious tolerance". It springs, not from pharisaic
pride or from pity pluming itself on its superiority, but
chiefly from respect for another's religious convictions,
which out of true charity we do not wish to distiu-b to
no purpose. Since innocent error may attain to the
firmest and sincerest conviction, the person's salva-
tion does not seem to be greatly imperilled until good
faith turns into bad faith, in which case alone the feel-
ing of pity has no justification. The good faith of the
heterodox person must, as a rule, be presumed, until
the contrary is clearly established. But even in the
extremest cases. Christian charity must never be
wounded, since the final judgment on the individual
conscience rests with Him who "searches the heart
and the reins". The same measure of respect which a
Catholic claims for his religion must be shown by him
to the rehgious convictions of non-CathoUcs. Here
obtains the principle which Gregory IX once recom-
mended in a Brief (6 April, 1233), addressed to the
French bishops concerning the attitude of Christians
towards the Jews: "Est autem Judaeis a Christianis
exhibenda benignitas, quam Christianis in Paganismo
existentibus cupimus exhiberi" (Christians ma.st show
towards Jews the same good will which we desire to
be shown to Christians in pagan lands). (Cf. Auvra)',
"Le registre de Gregoire IX", n. 1216.) Whoever
claims tolerance must likewise show tolerance. True
tolerance in the right place and under the right condi-
tions is one of the most ditficult, and also one of the
most beautiful and delicate virtues, and in the posses-
sion of it the true greatness of a noble and beautiful
soul is reflected. To such a soul has been communi-
cated, as it were, a spark of the burning charity of the
God of love. Who with infinite forbearance tolerates
the countless evils of the world, and suffers the cockle
to grow with the wheat until the harvest.
The precept of fraternal charity is transgressed by practical civic intolerance, which in more or less de- testable fashion transfers intolerance of the error to the erring persons. With complete justice did the sarcastic Swift wTite: "In religion many have just enough to make them hate one another, not enough to make them love one another" (cf. J. S. Mackenzie, "An Introduction to Social Philosophy", Glasgow, 1S90, p. 116). The intolerant man is avoided as much as possible by every high-minded person, both in society and in daily intercourse. The man who is tolerant in every emergency is alone lovable and wins the hearts of his feUowmen. Such tolerance is all the more estimable in one whose loj'al practice of his own faith wards off all suspicion of unbelief or religious indifference, and whose friendly bearing towards the heterodox emanates from pure neighbourly charity and a strict sense of justice. It is also an indispen- sable requisite for the maintenance of friendly inter- course and co-operation among a people composed of different religious denominations, and is the root of religious peace in the state. It should, therefore, be prized and promoted by the civil authorities as a safe- guard of the public weal, for a warfare of all against all, destructive of the state itself, must again break out (as at the time of the rehgious wars and of Amer- ican Knownothingism), if citizens be allowed to assail one another on account of rehgious differences. A person who by extensive travel or large experience has become acquainted with the world and men, and with the finer forms of life, does not easily develop into a lieretic-lumter, a sadly incongruous figure in the modern world.
(3) Public political tolerance is not a duty of the citizens, but is an affair of the State and of legisla- tion. Its essence consists in the fact that the State
