TRADUCIANISM
14
TRADUCIANISM
soning by the testimony of the senses, feelings, and
reason of all other men; their universal agreement is
the rule of certitude. Hence, to avoid scepticism, we
must begin with an act of faith preceding all reflection,
since reflection pre-supposes the knowledge of some
truth. This act of faith must have its criterion and
rule in the common consent or agreement of all, in
the general reason {la raison gcncrale). "Such is",
Lamennais concludes, "the law of human nature",
outside of which "there is no certitude, no language,
no society, no life" (cf. Defense de I'Essai sur I'ln-
difference, xi).
The Mitigated Traditionalists make a distinction between the order of acquisition (orilo acquisilionis) and the order of demonstration {ordo dcmonstrationis). The knowledge of metaphysical truths, they say, is absolutely necessary to man in order to act reason- ably. It must then be acquired by the child through teaching or tradition before he can use his i-eason. And this tradition can have its source only in a prim- itive revelation. Hence, in the order of acquisition, faith precedes science, \^'ith these truths, however, received by faith, human reason is able, through reflec- tion, to demonstrate the reasonableness of this act of faith, and thus, in the order of demonstration, science precedes faith (cf. Ubaghs, "Logics seu Philosophia; rationahs elementa", 6th ed., Louvain, 1860). When replaced in its historical surroundings, Traditionahsm clearly apjiears as a reaction and a protest against the rationalism of the philosophers of the eighteenth century and the anarchic individualism of the French Revolution. Against these errors it pointed out and emphasized the weakness and insufficiency of human reason, the influence of society, education, and tradi- tion on the development of human life and institu- tions. The reaction was extreme, and landed in the opposite error.
Criticism.— -Since Traditionalism, in its fundamen- tal principles, is a kind of Fideism, it falls under the condemnation pronounced by the Church and under the refutation furnished by reason and philosophy against Fideism. We may, however, advance cer- tain criticisms touching the characteristic elements of Traditionalism. It is evident, first of all, that authority, whatever be the way or agency in which it is presented to us, cannot of itself be the supreme criterion or rule of certitude. For, in order to be a rule of certitude, it must first be known as valid, com- petent, and legitimate, and reason must have ascer- tained this before it is entitled to our assent (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, Q. ii, a. 1). Without entering upon the psychological problem of the relations between thought and e.'cpression, and even admitting with de Bonald that the primitive elements of thought and language were originally given directly by God to man, we are not forced to conclude logically with him that our first act is an act of faith. Our first act should rather be an act of reason, acknowledging, by natural reflection, the credibility of the truths revealed by God. Lamennais's criterion of universal reason or consent is open to the same objections. First, how could uni- versal consent or general reason, which is nothing more than the collection of individual judgments or of individual reasons, give certitude, when each of these individual judgments is only matter of opinion or each of these individual reasons is declared to be fallible? Again, how could we in practice apply such a criterion; that is, how could we ascertain the uni- versality of such a judgment in the whole human race, even if only moral univcr.'iality were required? Moreover, what would be, in this system, the criterion of truth, concerning matters in which the hunum mind is not generally interested, or in the scientific prob- lems of which it is generally ini'ompetent? But above all, in order to give a firm and unhesitating assent to the teaching of universal consent, we must first have ascertained the reasonableness and legiti-
macy of its claims to our assent; that is, reason must
ultimately precede faith; otherwise our assent would
not be reasonable.
Mitigated or Semi-Traditionalism, in spite of its apparent differences, is substantially identical with pure Traditionalism, and falls under the same criti- cism, since rehgious and moral truths are declared to be given to man directly by Revelation and accepted by him antecedently to any act of his reason. More- over, there is no real foundation for the essential dis- tinction between the orders of invention and demon- stration, which is sujjposcd to distinguish Semi-Tradi- tionalism from pure Traditionalism. The difference between these two orders is only accidental. It con- sists in the fact that it is easier to demonstrate a truth already known than to discover it for the first time; but the facilities and process used in both operations are essentially the same, since to demonstrate a truth al- ready known is simply to reproduce, under the guidance of this knowledge, tlie operation performed and to take again the path followed in its first discovery (cf. St. Thomas, "De Veritatr", (). xi, a. 1). Semi-Tradi- tionalism and absolute Traditinnali.sm, then, rest upon the same fundamental crroi-, namely, that ultimately faith precedes reason. Let us point out, however, the partial truth contained in Traditionalism. .Against Individualism and Rationalism, it rightly insisted upon the social character of man, and rightly maintained that authority and education play a large ]iart in the intel- lectual, moral, and religious development of man. Rightly also it recalled to the human mind the neces- sity of respect for tradition, for the experience and teaching it contains, to secure a true and solid progress. I'niversal consent mayindeed be, in certain conditions, a criterion of truth. In many circumstances, it may furnish suggestion for the discovery of truth or afford confirmation of the truth already discovered; but it can ne\'er be the supreme criterion and rule of truth. Unless we admit that our reason is of itself capable of knowing with certainty some fundamental truths, we logically end in scepticism — the ruin of both human knowledge and faith. The true doctrine, as taught by the Catholic Chiu'ch and confirmed by psychology and history, is that man is physically and practically able to know with certainty some fundamental truths of the natural, moral, and religious order, but that, although he has the physical power, he remains in the conditions of the present life, morally and practically incapable of knowing sufficiently all the truths of the moral and religious order, without the help of Divine Revelation (cf. \'atii"i!i ('cnini'il, Si-^s. Ill, cap. ii).
ZiGLiABA. .Summer ;■' ' 1: •: l^7i;), I, Logica. pt.
II. bk. III. i, a. 3: Ml 1 . r,i(f (4th ed.. Lou-
vain. 1900). l>k. Ill, i. :i- 1 I -IS .MI,.,,, ; i>, (tones philosophies (Rome), Psychologia,c. tx, i\Li.KAti\,Fi/Al Vnnciples of Knowledge (4th ed., London, 1901), xii, xiii; Lupus, Le traditionalisme et le rationalisme (Lidge, 1859).
Georoe M. Sauv.^ge.
Traducianism (Iradux, a shoot or sprout, and more specifically a vine branch made to take root so as to propagate the vine), in general the doctrine that, in the process of generation, the human spiritual soul is transmitted to the offspring by the parents. When a distinction is made between the terms Traducianism and Generationisni, the former denotes the material- istic doctrine of the tran.smission of the soul by the organic process of generation, while the latter apjilies to the doctrine according to which the soul of the off- spring originates from the parental soul in some mys- terious way analogous to that in which the organism originates from the parent's organism. Traducian- ism is opposed to Creationism (q. v.) or the doctrine that everj- soul is created by God. Both, however, against Fmanationism (q. v.) and Evolutionism (q. v.) admit thai the first human soul originated by creation. They differ only as to the mode of origin of subsequent souls.
In the early centuries of the Christian Church, the
