CONCUPISCENCE
208
CONCURSUS
Concupiscence in its widest acceptation is any
yearning of the soul for good ; in its strict and specific
acceptation, a desire of the lower appetite contrary to
reason. To understand how the sensuous and the
rational appetite can be opposed, it should be borne in
mind that their natural objects are altogether differ-
ent. The object of the former is the gratification of
the senses; the object of the latter is the good of the
entire human nature and consists in the subordina-
tion of the lower to the rational faculties, and again
in the subordination of reason to God, its supreme
good and ultimate end. But the lower appetite is
of itself unrestrained, so as to pursue sensuous grati-
fications independently of the understanding and
without regard to the good of the higher faculties.
Hence desires contrary to the real good and order of
reason may, and often do, rise in it, previous to the
attention of the mind, and once risen, dispose the
bodily organs to their pursuit and solicit the will to
consent, while they more or less hinder reason from
considering their lawfulness or unlawfulness. This is
concupiscence in its strict and specific sense. As
long, however, as deliberation is not completely im-
peded, the rational will is able to resist such desires
and withhold consent, though it be not capable of
crushing the effects they produce in the body, and
though its freedom and dominion be to some extent
diminished. If, in fact, the will resists, a struggle
ensues, the sensuous appetite rebelliously demanding
its gratification, reason, on the contrary, clinging to
its own spiritual interests and asserting its control.
"The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit
against the flesh."
From the explanation given, it is plain that the op- position between appetite and reason is natural in man, and that, though it be an imperfection, it is not a corruption of human nature. Nor have the in- ordinate desires (actual concupiscence) or the prone- ness to them (habitual concupiscence) the nature of sin ; for sin, being the free and deliberate transgression of the law of God, can be only in the rational will; though it be true that they are temptations to sin, becoming the stronger antl the more frequent the oftener they have been indulged. As thus far consid- ered they are only sinful objects and antecedent causes of sinful transgressions; they contract the malice of sin only when consent is given by the will; not as though their nature were changed, but because they are adopted and completed by the will and so share its malice. Hence the distinction of concupiscence antecedent and concupiscence consequent to the con- sent of the will; the latter is sinfvil, the former is not.
The first parents were free from concupiscence, so that their sensuous appetite was perfectly subject to reason; and this freedom they were to transmit to posterity provided they observed the commandment of God. A short but important statement of the Catholic doctrine on this point may be quoted from Peter the Deacon, a Greek, who was sent to Rome to bear witness to the Faith of the East: "Our belief is that Adam came from the hands of his Creator good and free from the assaults of the flesh " (Lib. de Incarn., c. vi). In our first parents, however, this complete dominion of reason over appetite was no natural per- fection or acquirement, but a preternatural gift of God, that is, a gift not due to human nature; nor was it, on the other hand, the essence of their origi- nal justice, which consisted in sanctifying grace ; it was but a complement added to the latter by the Divine bounty. By the sin of Adam freedom from concu- piscence was forfeited not only for himself, but also for all his posterity with the exception of the Blessed Virgin by S[)ecial privilege. Human nature was de- prived of both its preternatural and su|)crnatural gifts and graces, the lower appetite began to lust against the si)irit, and evil habits, contracted by personal sins, wrought disorder in the body, obscured the mind, and
weakened the power of the will, without, however, de-
st roy ing its freedom. Hence that lamentable condition
of which St. Paul complains when he writes: "I find
then a law, that when I have a will to do good, evil is
present with me. For I am delighted with the law of
God, according to the inward man: but I see another
law in my members, fighting against the law of my
mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in
my members. Unhappy man that I am, who shall
deliver me from the body of this death?" (Rom., vii,
21-25). Christ by His death redeemed mankind from
sin and its bondage. In baptism the guilt of original
sin is wiped out and the soul is cleansed and justified
again by the infusion of sanctifying grace. But free-
dom from concupiscence is not restored to man, any
more than immortality ; abundant grace, however, is
given him, by which he may obtain the victory over
rebellious sense and deserve life everlasting.
The Reformers of the sixteenth century, especially Luther, proposed new views respecting concupiscence. They adopted as fundamental to their theology the following propositions: (1) Original justice with all its gifts and graces was due to man as an integral part of his nature; (2) concupiscence is of itself sinful, and, being the sinful corruption of human nature caused by Adam's transgression and inherited by all his descend- ants, is the very essence of original sin ; (3) baptism, since it does not extinguish concupiscence, does not really remit the guilt of original sin, but only effects that it is no longer imputed to man and no longer draws down condemnation on him. This position is held also by the Anglican Church in its Thirty-nine Articles and its Book of Common Prayer.
The Catholic Church condemns these doctrines as erroneous or heretical. The Council of Trent (Sess. V, c. v) defines that by the grace of baptism the guilt of original sin is completely remitted and does not merely cease to be imputed to man. As to concupiscence the council declares that it remains in those that are bap- tized in order that they may struggle for the victory, but does no harm to those who resist it by the grace of God, and that it is called sin by St. Paul, not because it is sin formally and in the proper sense, but because it sprang from sin and incites to sin. Later on Pius V, by the Bull "Ex omnibus afflictionibus" (1 Oct., 1567), Gregory XIII, by the Bull "Provisionis Nos- tra>" (29 Jan., 1579), Urban VIII, by the Bull "In eminenti" (6 March, 1641), condemned the proposi- tions of Bajus (21, 23, 24, 26), Clement XI, by the Constitution "Unigenitus", those of Quesnel (34, 35); and finallv Pius VI, by the Bull "Auctorem fidei" (28 Aug., '1794), those of the SjTiod of Pistoja (16), which maintained that the gifts and graces bestowed on .\dam and constituting his original justice were not supernatural but due to human nature. (See Grace, Justification, Sin.)
Hunter. Outlints of Dogmatic Theology (2nd ed.. New York, 1896), treatise x, ch. iii. iv; Joseph Rickaby, Xotfs on St. Fault Epistle to the Roxnans (London, 1S9S), vii, liii; Bellarmine, De Controversiis Fidei, IV. De Gratid primi hominis; De amis- sione gratia: et statu peccati (Milan, 18621; Hurter, TheologitB Dogmalicce Compendium (10th ed., 1900); Murrat, Tractatus de Gratia (Dublin, 18771. disp. ii; Billuart, Samma S. Thomte (Lyons and Paris. 1S61\ III, 290-94, IV, 69-71. 273, 382, VIII, ISO. 181.
John J. Ming.
Concurrents. See Do.minic.vl Letter.
Concursus, -a special competitive examination pre- scribed in canon law for all aspirants to certain ecclesi- astical oliices to which is attached the cure of souls. There were no parish priests, projierly s[)eaking, dur- ing the first three hundred years of the Christian Era. A single church erected in the rcsidciitiid city of the bishop was the centre to which ])eopl(' living in city and coimtry repaired on Sinidays anil festivals to hear Ma.ss, receive instruction, and approach the Sacra- ments. Gradual growth in church-membership called for the erection of additional churches to accommo-
