CONSENTIUS
284
CONSERVATOR
boily of the otlier, a right that carries with it eveiy
prerogative vested therein by the laws of nature. It
is not necessarj", however, that the intention of parties
to a marriage contract should be explicitly directed to
all its conditions or circumstances. On the contrary,
an intention implicitly thereunto directed is entirely
sufficient for all practical intents and purposes.
Hence, as often as marriageable parties intend to con-
tract marriage in the way in which men and women
ordinarily understand that agreement, or according
to the w-ay in which it was instituted by the Author
of this sacrament, they exhibit consent sufficient to
render their marriage contract entirely valid, provided
nothing essential is positively excluded by a counter
intention usurping the place of the chief, indispensable
intention in entering matrimony. While marriage
contracts are null unless based on the consent of those
concerned, it is usually very difficult to establish the
actual absence of this consent so as to satisfy the judge
in a matrimonial court, once the marriage ceremony
has really taken place. (For the renewal of consent
in the case of invalid marriages, see Revalid.a.tion,
and for the consent requisite for espousals, see Espou-
s.\LS.) While in canon law the consent of parents is
not necessarj' to validate the marriages of their chil-
dren, it is usually required to render such marriages
legitimate. [For the civil law concerning the consent
of parents in France (modified 1907), Germany, Aus-
tria, Switzerland, Canada, etc., see Marri.vgb.]
In the United States the common law exacts no solemnity to validate matrimonial consent. In many of the States, however, special statutes carry- ing a penalty require certain conditions for the legit- imacy of such consent. Common law regards mar- riage as a civil contract for which consent alone is essential. It demands no legal forms, nor religious solemnities, nor special mode of proof. According to common law, consent indicated by words covering the present, whether consummation follows or not, or by words pertaining to the future together with consum- mation, constitutes a valid marriage. In New York, Illinois, and Rhode Island words pertaining to the fu- ture, even with subsequent consiunmation, no longer render a marriage valid. Even without explicit proof of words implying consent, cohabitation, acknowledg- ment of a marriage by the parties concerned, reception of such parties as husband and wife by relatives, friends, or society, are sufficient to establish a valid marriage.
Canon law requires the consent of cathedral chap- ters to lend validity to certain official acts of bishops. In general, this consent is necessary in such matters as usually involve a serious obligation or the possi- bility of a notable damage, or in matters which simul- taneously pertain to bishops and their chapters. Nevertheless, unwritten law can narrow the rights of chapters and widen the liberty of bishops in these matters unless circumstances conspire to stamp par- ticular measures as unreasonable. In like manner, unwritten law may exact the consent of chapters in matters of secondary importance, a requirement sometimes enjoined by special statutes. When im- mediate action is necessary, and it is impossible to convoke their chapters, bishops may proceed validly without the chapters' consent. Inasmuch as there are no cathedral chapters in the United States, dioc- esan consultors constitute the atlvisory board of the bishops. The Third Plenary Coimcil of Baltimore specifies several instances in which the l>ishops, though not obliged to abide by the advice of their consultors, are boimd to seek such advice, else their acts in such cases are liable to nullification.
For consent in its relation to sinful acts, see Sin, and for the consent of the legislative authority in the formation of consuetudinary law, see Cu.stom.
OjETTi, Synopsis reriim moriilium el juris ponlilicii (Prato, 1904); In.-ilruclio Pnxloralis Ei/eslrllensis (FreiburK. 1902), in- dex, s. V. Consen.ius: IIkineh, Grunilriss des kalh. Eherrchls (MuQster, 1905), index, s. v. Konscns; Hebgenhotheu-Holl-
WECK, Lchrbtich dcs kath. Kirchenrechts (FreiburK, 190.">). ii
dex. s. V. Consensus; Permaneder in Kirchenlex.. Ill, 956 sc). O'NeiLL.
Consentius. — The name of a fifth-century Gallo- Roman family, three of whose representatives are known in history:
(1) Consentius of N.^rbon-VE, clarissimus, "who combined the honour of a prefecture with philosophy" , was a correspondent of Sidonius ApoUinaris, who dedicated to him a poem on Narbonne. He used all metres — iambic, elegiac, hendecasyllabic, and the hexameter — and wrote in Greek as well as in Latin. His poems are redolent of flowers and thyme (Sidonius, Carm.. xxiii, 20, and 2.3-1-240; Epist., Ill, 6; VIII, 4; IX, 15). However, these praises must not be taken too literally, as Sidonius counted among his friends thirty men who were similarly gifted. The authors of the "Histoire litteraire de la France" make a distinction between the Con- sentius to whom the poem was dedicated and Con- sentius the epistolary author, maintaining the former to have been the father of the latter. — (2) Con- sentius, father of the former, a native of Narbonne and a poet, a contemporary of Valentinian, and son- in-law of Flavius Valens Jovinus, consul in 367. — (.3) Consentius, a Gallic grammarian, was the author of two treatises, which are perhaps the fragments of a complete grammar: one on the noun and the verb, much used during the Carlovingian period, and the other on barbarisms and metaplasm. An edition of these treatises has been published by Keil in "Grammatici Latini" (Leipzig), vol. V, p. 3.36.
Histoire lilleraire de la France (Paris, 1735), II. 249-50, 431- 33, 653-56; Teuffel, Geschichte der romischen Literatur (Leip- zig, 1S90); Keil, Grammatici Latini (1885), V, 338, 404.
Paul Lejay.
Conservator (from Lat. conservare), a judge dele- gated by the pope to defend certain privileged classes of persons — as universities, religious orders, chapters, the poor — from manifest or notorious injury or vio- lence, without recourse to a judicial process. Con- servators were appointed as early as the thirteenth century. Innocent IV presupposes their existence in the decree (c. 15, de off. et pot. jud., del. I, 14, in VI°) from which we first learn their power. Owing to abuses and complaints the Council of Trent (Sess. XIV, c. V, de ref.) limited their jurisdiction, but new controversies, often recurring, caused Clement VIII, Gregory XV, and Innocent X to define their privileges more precisely. Troubles continuing to arise, espe- cially concerning the conservators of religious orders, Clement XIII (23 April, 1762) decreed that in mis- sionary coimtries such officials should no longer be chosen, but that all controversies should be referred to the Holy See. From that time forth conservators fell into practical desuetude. According to law, these officials were to be chosen from among the prelates or dignitaries of cathedral and collegiate churches ; later from the synodal judges. When a con.servator had been chosen by regulars he could not be ren\oved for five years without cause. He had no jurisdiction in cases that reciuired juritlical examination. While he took cognizance of all complaints against regulars, he had no authority to receive those of the regulare against others unless they were notorious. In the latter ca.se the conservator decided the question sum- marily. He could pimish with ecclesiastical penalties even high church dignitaries who interfered with his duties. His power was limited, however, to the one dioiT^i- ill wliiih he had been elected, nor could the saiiii' 1 -. 1 \ iliir have power in .several dioceses.
Amu, U v., ,, Ii. UkI. de Jioil can. l3d ed.. Pari.-i, 19011. I; WKKNi. J„.i U.rrelaUum (Rome, 1S99), II; Holiix, De Jure Ke- gular. (3deU., Puns. 1883), II.
William H. ^\'. Fanning.
