COUNCILS
430
COUNCILS
wnod, whereas the emperor, to show clearly that he
did not consider himself the president, would only
subscribe after all the bishops. The papal legates
begged hiin to put his and his son's names at the head
of the list, but he stoutly refused and only consented,
at last, to write his name after those of the papal
legates and of the Eastern patriarchs, but before those
of the bishops. Consequently Pope Adrian II, in a
letter to the emperor, praises him for not having
assisted at the council as a judge (judex), but merely
as a witness and protector {conscius et obsecundator).
The imperial commissaries present at the synod acted even less as presidents than the emperor him- self. They signed the reports of the several sessions only after the representatives of the patriarchs, though before the bishops; their names are absent from the signatures of the Acts. On the other hand it may be contended that the Eastern patriarchs, Ignatius of Constantinople, and the representatives of the other Eastern patriarchs, in some degree par- ticipated in the presidency: their names are con- stantly associated with those of the Roman legates and clearly distinguished from those of the other metropolitans and bishops. They, as it were, form with the papal legates a board of directors, fix with him the order of proceedings, determine who shall be heard, subscribe, like the legates, before the emperor, and are entered in the reports of the several sessions before the imperial commissaries. All this being granted, the fact still remains that the papal legates unmistakably hold the first place, for they are alwaj's named first and sign first, and — a detail of great im- portance — for the final subscription they use the formula: huic sanche et tiniversali synodo prwsidens (presiding over this holy and universal synod), while Ignatius of Constantinople and the representa- tives of the other patriarchs claim no presidency, but word their subscription thus: suscipiens et omni- bus qiicE ab ed judicata et scripta sunt concordans et definiens subscripsi (receiving this holy and universal synod and agreeing with all it has judged and written, and defining I have signed). If, on the one hand, this form of subscription differs from that of the president, it diPers no less, on the other, from that of the bishops. These, like the emperor, have without exception used the formula; suscipiens (synodum) subscripsi (receiv- ing the synod I have signed), omitting the otherwise customary definiens, which was used to mark a decisive vote (votum decisivum).
Hefele gives similar documentary accounts of the first eight general synods, showing that papal legates always presided over them when occupied in their proper business of deciding questions on faith and dis- cipline. The exclusive right of the pope in this matter was generally acknowledged. Thus, the Emperor Theodosius II says, in his edict addressed to the Coun- cil of Ephesus, that he had sent Count Candidian to represent him, but that this imperial commissary was to take no part in dogmatic disputes since "it was un- lawful for one who is not enrolled in the lists of the most holy bishops to mingle in ecclesiastical inquiries". The Council of Chalcedon acknowledged that Pope Leo, by his legates, presided over it as " the head over the members". At Nica>a, Hosiiis, Vitus, and Vincen- tius, as papal legates, signed before all other members of the council. The right of presiding and directing implies that the pope, if he chooses to make a full use of his powers, can determine the subject matter to be dealt with by the council, prescribe rules for conduct- ing the debates, and generally order the whole busi- ness as seems best to him. Hence no conciliar decree is legitimate! if carried under protest — or even without the positive consent — of the pope or his legates. The consent of the legates alone, acting without a special order from the pope, is not .sufficient to make conciliar decrees at once |)erfect and operative; what is neces- sary is the pope's own consent. F'or this reason no
decree can become illegitimate and null in law on ac-
count of pressure brought to bear on the assembly by
the presiding pope, or by papal legates acting on his
orders. Such pressure and restriction of liberty, pro-
ceeding from the internal, natural principle of order
through the use of lawful power, does not amount to
o.\ternal, unnatural coercion, and, therefore, does not
invalidate the Acts due to its exercise.
Examples of councils working at high pressure, if the expression may be used, without spoiling their output, are of frequent occurrence. Most of the early coimcils were convened to execute decisions al- ready finally fixed by the pope, no choice being left the assembled Fathers to arrive at another decision. They were forced to confonn their judgment to that of Rome, with or without discussion. Should papal pressure go beyond the limits of the council's dignity and of the importance of the matters under discussion, the effect would be, not the invalidation of the coun- cil's decrees, but the paralysing of its moral influence and practical usefulness. On the other hand, the fact that a synod is, or has been, acting under the leader- ship of its Divinely appointed head, is the best guar- antee of its freedom from unnatural disturbances, such as intrigues from below or coercion from above. In the same way violent interference with the papal leadership is the grossest attack on the council's nat- ural freedom. Thus the Robber Synod of Ephe- sus (449), though intended to be general and at firet duly authorized by the presence of papal legates, was declared invalid and null by those same legates at Chalcedon (451), because the prejudiced Emperor Theodosius II had removed the representatives of the pope, and entrusted the direction of the council to Dioscurus of .Alexandria.
(c) Confirmation. — Confirmation of the conciliar de- crees is the third factor in the pope's necessary co- operation with the council. The council does not represent the teaching Church till the visible head of the Church has given his approval, for, unapproved, it is but a headless, soulless, impersonal body, unable to give its decisions the binding force of laws for the whole Church, or the finality of judicial sentences. With the papal approval, on the contrary, the coun- cil's pronouncements represent the fullest effort of the teaching and ruling Church, a. judicium plcnissimum, beyond which no power can go. Confirmation being the final touch of perfection, the seal of authority, and the veiy life of conciliar decrees, it is necessary that it should be a personal act of the highest authority, for the highest authority cannot be delegated. So much for the principle, or the question of right. When we look for its practical working throughout the history of councils, we find great diversity in the way it has been applied under the influence of varjung circum- stances.
(1) Councils over which the pope presides in person require no further formal confinnation on his part, for their decisions formally include his own as the body includes the soul. The Vatican Council of 1869-70 offers an example in point.
(2) Councils over which the pope presides through his legates are not identified with himself in the same degree as the former. They constitute separate, de- pendent, representative tribimals, whose findings only become final through ratification by the authority for which they act. Such is the theory. In practice, however, the papal confirmation is, or may be, pre- sumed in the following cases: —
(a) When tlie council is convened for the express purpose of carrying out a papal decision previously arrived at, as was the case with most of the early .synods; or when the legates give their consent in vir- tue of a special public instruction emanating from the pope; in these circvnnstances the papal ratification pre-exists, is implied in the conciliar decision, and need not be formally renewed after the council. It
