GOD
f)l6
GOD
things are good which are seen. But then again they
are not to lie pardoned. For if they were able to know
so nuich as to make a judgment of the world: how di<l
they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?"
Here it is clearly taught (a) that the phenomenal or
contingent world — the things that are seen — requires
a cause distinct from and greater than itself or any of
its elements; (b) that this cause who is God is not un-
knowable, but is known with certainty not only to
exist but to possess in Himself, in a higher degree,
whatever beauty, strength, or other perfections are
realized in His works; (c) that this conclusion is at-
tainable by the right exercise of human reason, with-
out reference to supernatural revelation, and that
philosophers, therefore, who are able to interpret the
world philosophically, are inexcusable for their ignor-
ance of the true God, their failure, it is implied, being
due rather to lack of good will than to the incapacity
of the human mind.
Substantially the same doctrine is laid down more briefly by St. Paul in Rom., i, 18-20; " For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those men that detain the truth of God in injustice: because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him, from the crea- tion of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable." It is to be observed that the pagans of whom St. Paul is speaking are not blamed for their ignorance of super- natural revelation and the Mosaic law, but for failing to preserve or for corrupting that knowledge of (iod and of man's duty towards Him which nature itself ought to have taught them. Indeed it is not pure ignorance as such they are blamed for, but that wilful shirking of truth which renders ignorance culpable. Even under the corruptions of paganism St. Paul recognized the indestructible permanency of germinal religious truth (cf. Rom., ii, 14, 15).
It is clear from these passages that Agnosticism and Pantheism are condemned by revelation, while the validity of the general proof of God's existence given above (I, Section A) is confirmed. It is also clear that the extreme form of Traditionalism (q. v.), which would hold that no certain knowledge of God's exist- ence or nature is attainable by human reason without the aid of supernatural revelation, is condemned.
(2) And what the author of Wisdom and St. Paul, and after them the Fathers and theologians had con- stantly taught, has been solemnly defined by the Vati- can Council. In the first place, as against Agnosticism and Traditionalism, the council teaches (cap. ii, De revelat.) "That God, the first cause (principium) and last end of all things, can, from created things, be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason" (Denz., 1785 — old no. 1634); and in the cor- responding canon (can. i, De revelat.) it anathema- tizes anyone who would say " that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot, through the things that are made, be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason" (Denz., 1806 — old no. 1653). As against Agnosticism this definition needs no expla- nation. As against Traditionalism, it is to be observed that the definition is directed only against the extreme form of that theory, as held by Lamennais and others, according to which, taking human nature as it is, there would not, and could not, have been any true or certain knowledge of God, among men, had there not been at least a primitive supernatural revelation — in other words natural religion as such is an impossibil- ity. There is no reference to milder forms of Tradi- tionalism which hold social tradition and education to be necessary for the development of man's rational powers, and consequently deny, for example, that an individual cut off from human society from his in- fancy, and left entirely to himself, could ever attain a
certain knowledge of God, or any strictly rational
knowledge at all. That is a psychological problem on
which the council has nothing to say. Neither does
it deny that even in case of the homo socialis a certain
degree of education and culture may be required in
order that he may, by independent reasoning, arrive
at a knowledge of God; but it merely aflnrms the broad
principle that by the proper use of their natural rea-
soning power, applied to the phenomena of the uni-
verse, men are able to know God with certainty.
In the next place, as against Pantheism, the council (cap. i, De Deo) teaches that God, "since He is one singular, altogether simple and incommutable spirit- ual substance, must be proclaimed to be really and essentially [re et essentia] distinct from the world, most happy in and by Himself, and ineffably above and beyond all things, actual or possible, besides Him- self " (Denzinger, 1782 — old no. 1631); and in the cor- responding canons (ii-iv, De Deo) anathema is pro- nounced against anyone who would say " that nothing exists but matter"; or "that the substance or essence of God and of all things is one and the same "; or " that finite things both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the Divine substance; or that the Divine essence by a manifestation or evo- lution of itself becomes all things; or that God is uni- versal or indefinite being, which by determining itself constitutes the universe of things distinguished into genera, species and individuals" (Denzinger, 1802-4 — old no. 1648). These definitions are framed so as to cover and exclude every type of the pantheistic theory, and nobody will deny that they are in har- mony with Scriptural teaching. The doctrine of creation, for example (see Cre.vtion), than which none is more clearly taught or more frequently empha- sized in Sacred Scripture, is radically opposed to Pan- theism — creation as the sacred writers understand it being the voluntary act of a free agent bringing crea- tures into being out of nothingness.
(3) It will be observed that neither the Scriptural texts we have quoted nor the Vatican decrees say that God's existence can be proved or demonstrated; they merely affirm that it can be known with certainty. Now one may, if one wishes, insist on the distinction be- tween what is knowable and what is demonstrable, but in the present connexion this distinction has little real import. It has never been claimed that God's exist- ence can be proved mathematically, as a proposition in geometry is proved, and most Theists reject every form of the ontological or deductive proof. But if the term proof or demonstration may be, as it often is, ap- plied to a posteriori or inductive inference, by means of which knowledge that is not innate or intuitive is acquired by the exercise of reason, then it cannot fairly be denied that Catholic teaching virtually as- serts that God's existence can be proved. Certain knowledge of God is declared to be attainable " by the light of reason ", i. e. of the reasoning faculty as such, from or through " the things that are made "; and this clearly implies an inferential process such as in other connexions men do not hesitate to call proof.
Hence it is fair to conclude that the Vatican Coun- cil, following Sacred Scripture, has virtually con- demned the Scepticism which rejects the a posteriori proof [see above. A, (1)]. But it did not deal directly with Ontologism, although certain propositions of the Ontologists had already been condemned as unsafe (tuto tradi non posse) by a decree of the Holy Office, 18 Sept., 1861 (Denzinger, 1659 sqq. — old no. 1516), and among the propositions of Rosmini subsequently con- demned (14 Dec, 1887) several reassert the ontolo- gist principle (Denzinger, 1891 sq. — old no. 1736). This condemnation by the Holy Office is quite suffi- cient to discredit Ontologism, regarding which it is enough tosay lnTc(a) (liat, as already observed (I, A,), experience eontrailicts the assumption that the lumian mind has naturally or necessarily an immediate con-
