IDEA
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IDEA
chronological order of his writings is not certain, and,
finally, still more because we do not know how far the
mythological setting is to be taken literally. Approx-
imately, however, Plato's view seems to come to this:
— To the universal notions, or concepts, which con-
stitute science, or general knowledge as it is in our
mind, there correspond ideas outside of our mind.
These ideas are truly universal. They possess objec-
tive reality in themselves. They are not something
indwelling in the individual things, as, for instance,
form in matter, or the essence which determines the
nature of an object. Each universal idea has its own
separate and independent existence apart from the
individual object related to it. It seems to dwell in
some sort of celestial universe (iv oipavlif rlnrif). In
contrast with the individual objects of sense experi-
ence, which undergo constant change and flux, the
ideas are perfect, eternal, and immutable. Still, there
must be some sort of community between the in-
dividual object and the corresponding idea, between
Socrates and the idea "man", between this act of
justice and the idea "justice". This community
consists in "participation" (M^Se|is). The concrete
individual participates, or shares, in the universal
idea, and this participation constitutes it an individual
of a certain kind or nature. But what, then, is this
participation, if the idea dwells in another sphere of
existence? It seems to consist in imitation (^iMIf's).
The ideas are models and prototypes, the sensible
objects are copies, though very imperfect, of these
models. The ideas are reflected in a feeble and ob-
scure way in them. The idea is the archetype (irap-
ii5«7/ia), individual objects are merely images (cfSuXa).
Finally, what precisely is the celestial universe in
which the ideas have eternally existed, and what is
their exact relation to God or to the idea of the good?
For Plato allots to this latter a unique position in
the transcendental region of ideas. Here we meet a
fundamental difference between the answers from
two schools of interpreters.
Aristotle, who, his critics notwithstanding, was as competent as they to understand Plato, and was Plato's own pupil, teaches that his master ascribed to the various ideas an independent, autonomous exist- ence. They are a multiplicity of i-solated es.sences existing separated from the individual objects which copy them, and they are united by no common bond. All the relations subsisting in the hierarchies of our universal concepts, however, seem in Plato's view to be represented by analogous relations amongst the autonomous ideas. Aristotle's interpretation was accepted by St. Thomas and the main body of the later Scholastics; and much pain has been devoted to establishing the absurdity of this alleged theory of separation. But the ultra realism of the Platonic theory of ideas was susceptible of a more benevo- lent interpretation, which, moreover, was adopted by nearly all the early Fathers of the Church. Indeed they found it easier to Christianize his philosophy than did Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas to do the like for that of Aristotle. They unanimously under- stood Plato to locate this world of ideas in the Mind of God, and they explained his xiff/tos voijtAs as a system of Divine conceptions — the archetypes according to which God was to form in the future the various species of created beings. With respect to the origin of our knowledge of these universal ideas, Plato cannot consistently derive it from sensuous experience. He therefore teaches that our universal concepts, which correspond to these ideas, are, strictly speaking, in- nate, inherited by the soul from a previous state of existence. There, in that transcendental Eden, the soul, by direct contemplation of the ideas, acquired these concepts. Sensible experience of the objects around us now merely occasions the reminiscence of these pre-natal cognitions. The acquisition of knowl- edge is thus, strictly speaking, a process of recollection.
Aristotle vigorously attacked Plato's theory of univer-
sal ideas. He himself teaches that sensible experience
of the concrete individual is the beginning and foun-
dation of all cognition. Intellectual knowledge, how-
ever, is concerned with the universal. But it must
have been derived from the experience of the individ-
ual, which, therefore, in some way contains the
universal. The universal cannot exist, as such, apart
from the individual. It is immanent in the individual
as the essence, or nature, specifically common to all
members of the class. Since this essence, or nature,
constitutes the thing specifically what it is, man,
horse, triangle, etc., it furnishes the answer to the
question: What is the thing? (Quid est.'). It has
therefore been termed the quidiiity of the thing. In
Greek, according to .\ristotle, the t6 tI J/v eiroi, cISos,
/jLopipri, and ovala Sein-cpa are one and the same thing —
the essence, or quiddity, which determines the specific
nature of the thing. This is the foundation for the
general concept in the mind, which abstracts the
universal form (elSos nriTSf) from the individual.
Several of the early Fathers, as we have said, inter-
preted Plato benevolently, and sought to harmonize
as much of his doctrine as po.ssibIe with Christian
theology. For them the ideas are the creative
thoughts of God, the archetypes, or patterns, or forms
in the mind of the Author of the universe according to
which he has made the various species of creatures.
"Ideae principales forma? quaedam vel rationes rerum
stabiles atque incommutabiles, quje in divina intelli-
gentia continentur" (St. .\ugust., " De Div.", Q. xlvi).
These Divine ideas must not be looked on as distinct
entities, for this would be inconsistent with the Divine
simplicity. They are identical with the Divine Es-
sence contemplated by the Divine Intellect as suscep-
tible of imitation ad extra.
Scholastic Period. — This doctrine of the Fathers re- ceived its complete elaboration from the Schoolmen in the great controversy concerning universals {de universalibus) which occupied a prominent place in the history of philosophy from the tenth to the thir- teenth century. The ultra-realists tended towards the Platonic view in regard to the real existence of universal forms, as such, outside of the human mind, though they differed as to their explanation of the nature of this universality, and its participation by the individuals. Thus William of Champeaux seems to have understood the universal to exist essentially in its completeness in each individual of the species. In essence these individuals are but one, and what- ever difference they have is one of accidents, not of substance. This would lead to a pantheistic con- ception of the universe, akin to that of Scotus Eriu- gena. On the other hand, the extreme Nominalist view, advocated by Roscelin, denies all real universal- ity, except that of words. — .\ common name may be applied to the several objects of a species or genus, but neither in the existing individuals nor in the mind is there a genuine basis or correlate for this community of predication. The Aristotelean doctrine of moder- ate realism, which was already in possession before the eleventh century, held its ground throughout the whole period of Scholasticism, notwithstanding the appearance of distinguished champions of the rival hypothesis, and at last permanently triumphed with the establishment of the authority of St. Thomas. This theory, which in its complete form we may call the Scholastic doctrine of universals, distinguished universalia ante res, in rebus, et post res. The universal exists in the Divine Mind only as an idea, model, or prototype of a plurality of creatures before the in- dividual is realized. Genus or species cannot in order of time precede the individual. Plato's separate ideas, did they physically exist, would have been individual- ized by their existence and have thus ceased to be universals. The universal exists in the individual only potentially or fundamentally, not actually or
