IMPEDIMENTS
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IMPEDIMENTS
non in proprio supposito, sed tractum ad esse et sup-
positum Verbi, mediants came aut corpore parte).
Consequently, he maintains that it is correct to say:
" The Body of Christ is ' impanated ', i. e. has become
bread" (Corpus Christi impanatum, i. e. panis fac-
tum) ; still it cannot be said that " the Man or Christ
has become bread " (sed hominem aut Christum non
possumus dicere impanatum), an explanation which is
certainly not too conspicuous for clearness and pre-
cision. Amongst the reformers, Andreas Osiander (d.
1552), a fervent disciple of Luther, seems to have held
the doctrine of impanation, though later Lutheran
theologians have tried to acquit him of this error. It
is, however, difficult to discern the real meaning of this
fiery writer from his confused expressions. For this
reason Melanchthon, in a letter of 22 llarch, 153S, to
the pastor Vitus Theodorus in Nuremberg, merely
expresses his suspicion that Osiander held the doc-
trine of impanation. Both Melanchthon and Luther
were thoroughly opposed to this absurd opinion. And
this for many reasons, but especially because they
would have been obliged to adore in the strictest sense
of the word {cultu lalria-) the bread hypostatically
united with the Body of Christ, and this would have
been in diametrical opposition to the Lutheran princi-
ples and practices of the Lord's Supper. Recently,
Bayma, a Catholic theologian, in a series of theses
proposed a theory onTransubstantiation, which, upon
critical examination, comes very close to the above
mentioned teaching of William of Paris; in fact, it
seems to explain the Real Presence of Christ in the
Eucharist by impanation. He bases his theory on the
proposition that the substance of bread, in conse-
quence of the conversion, ceases to be substance, and
that it receives a new subject, without undergoing
interior change, having its support no longer in itself
but in another suppositum (substantia panis desinit
esse substantia eo solum, et absque alia sui mutatione,
quod in alio supernaturaliter sustentatur, ita ut jam
non in se sit, sed in alio ut in primo subjecto). Conse-
quently it is the Body of Christ that supports the
nature of the bread (Corpus Christi sustentat na-
turam panis). Of this hypothesis, which denies a real
Transubstantiation entirely, or admits it only nom-
inally, the Holy Office justly declared: tolerari non
posse (7 July, 1875 — cf . Denzinger, " Enchiridion ",
1843-46, 10th ed., Freiburg, 1908). The doctrine of
impanation as far as it denies the Transubstantiation
of bread and wine is certainly a heresy; besides, it is
also against reason, since a hypostatic union between
the Word of God Incarnate, or the God-man Christ,
and the dead substances of bread and wine is incon-
ceivable. Much less conceivable is such a union if we
presuppose Transubstantiation, for since the sub-
stance of bread no longer exists it cannot enter into a
hypostatic union with Christ.
ScHWANE, Dogmengescliichte, III (Freiburg, 1SS2). 659; Franzelin, De Eucharistim sacramento (4th ed., Rome, 18S7), thes. XV, scholion: Schmid ia Kirchentex., s.v. : Ch. Pesch., PriElect. Dogmaticce, VI (3rd ed., Freiburg, 190S). 312 sqq. ; PoHLE, Lekrbuch der Doginatik, III (3rd ed., Paderbom, 190S), 232 sq.
J. POHLE.
Impediments, C.«JONicAL. — I.Gener.\l Notion of AN Impedi.ment. — The Latin word impedimenlum sig- nifies directly whatever embarrasses or hinders a per- son, whatever is an obstacle to his movements, and in this sense the baggage of an army was called impedi- menta. Juridical language applies the term to what- ever hinders the free action of an agent, or to whatever prevents him from performing, or at least from per- forming regularly, any act that the law takes cogni- zance of. The impediment therefore affects directly the juridical capacity of the agent, restrains it, or even entirely suppresses it; indirectly it affects the action itself, which it renders more or less defective or even null. An impediment consequently produces its effect
by reason of a defect; it ceases when the agent has
legally recovered his capacity, whether that be by a
dispensation or by his fulfilling the conditions requisite
for the act he wishes to perform. The impediment, in
other words, the restriction or suppression of the ju-
ridical capacity of the agent, may arise from natural
laws, from Divine law, or from human law, ecclesia.s-
tical or civil ; we may, however, point out that certain
cases of nullity, certain defects of acts that the law
takes cognizance of, are caused by the absence of an
essential constitutive element; for example in the case
of a contract imposed by force on one of the parties,
there would be no impediment unless in a wide im-
proper sense of the term. This general idea of impedi-
ments is applicable to all those acts in regard to which
the law regulates the juridical capacity of the agents;
for instance, acquisition of jurisdiction, contracts in
religious matters, the sacraments. Canon law affords
a multitude of examples. A layman, a heretic, an ex-
communicated person is incapable of acquiring spir-
itual jurisdiction; better known are the restrictions
placed on minors, religious, children not yet emanci-
pated, etc., in the matter of making contracts; finally,
there are many legal obstacles affecting the capacity
of the faithful to receive licitly or even validly, bap-
tism, confirmation, penance, and particularly Holy
orders and matrimony.
Canon law u.ses the word impediment in its re- stricted and technical sense, only in reference to mar- riage, while impediments to Holy orders are spoken of as irregularities (q. v.). We may remark, however, that several real impediments or obstacles to the re- ception of Holy orders are not called irregularities; thus, women and unbaptized persons, who are by Divine law incapable of being ordained, are not termed irregular. But speaking of matrimony, the word im- pediment refers to all obstacles, whether arising from natural or Divine law. Another interesting fact is that whereas the word impediment has thus acquired a precise technical meaning in canon law, the cognate words impedire, impediens, impeditus, have preserved their wide grammatical signification and may be ap- plied to other matters; so writers speak of those un- able to go personally to Rome to be absolved from censures as impediti adire Romam, and the Consti- tution " Apost. Sedis " speaks of those who hinder {im pedientes) the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
II. Impediments to M.vrriage, in Gener.vl. — The fundamental idea of an impediment to matrimony is contained implicitly in the well known prohibitions of Leviticus and some ancient canonical texts; in the latter may be discovered the basis of the celebrated distinction between diriment impediments which ren- der a marriage null and void, and prohibitory impedi- ments which only render it illicit; sometimes the canons of councils insist on the separation of the parties who have violated the law, which implies that the marriage was void; sometimes, on the contrary, they exact only an expiation or reparation, without dissolving the conjugal union, which implies that the marriage was valid though more or less in opposition to the law. But these ancient canonical texts do not give a complete list of impediments, much less a gen- eral theory concerning them. It is only at the end of the twelfth century that we find, for the first time. tJie use of the word " impediment " in its technical sense, together with a catalogue of matrimonial impedi- ments. In his " Decree", Gratian neither speaks def- initely, nor does he give a satisfactory list; nor does Peter Lombard in his "Sentences". About 1190 Ber- nard of Pavia uses freely the expression, which became classical, " impedit contrahendum et dirimit contrac- tus", and further he enumerated the impediments: " sunt autem quse matrimonium impediunt xiv", but his list is not definitive; the technical names of each impediment remain for some time longer unsettled. However the doctrine of the School soon becomes fi.xeci
