INFALLIBILITY
794
INFALLIBILITY
been anticipated in the preceding sections; but some
others deserve a passing notice here. (1) It has been
urged (v. g. Martineau, "Seat of Authority in Re-
ligion", pp. 66-6S) that neither a fallible individual nor
a collection of fallible individuals can constitute an
infallible organ. This is quite true in reference
to natural knowledge and would be also true as ap-
plied to Church authority if Christianity were assumed
to Vje a mere product of natural reason. But we set
out from an entirely different standpoint. We assume
as antecedent!}' and independently established that
God can supernaturally guide and enlighten men,
individually or collectively, in such a way tliat, not-
withstanding the natural falliliility of human intelli-
gence, they may speak and may Ije known with cer-
tainty to speak in His name and with His authority,
so that their utterance may be not merely infallible
but inspired. .Xntl it is only with those who accept
tliis standpoint that the question of the Church's
infallibility can be profitably discussed.
(2) Again, it is said that even those who accept the supernatural view-point must ultimately fall back on fallible human reasoning in attemptmg to prove infallibility; that behind any conclusion that is proposed on so-called infallible authority there always lurks a premise which cannot claim for itself more than a merely human and fallil)le certainty; and that, since the strength of a conclusion is no greater than that of its weaker premise, the principle of in- fallibility is a useless as well as an illogical importation into Christian theology. This is a line of argument frequently used by Salmon (Infallibility, pp. 47-49, 57 sq., 79, 279, etc.), one of the subtlest of the recent opponents of infallibility who have written from what might be descril.ied as the orthodox Protestarit standpoint. In reply it is to be observed that this argument, if valid, would prove very much more than it is here introduced to pro\'e; that it would indeed undermine the very foundations of Christian faith. For example, on purely rational grounds I have only moral certainty that Clod Himself is infallible or that Christ was the infallible mediator of a Divine Revela- tion; yet if I am to give a rational defence of my faith, even in mysteries which I do not comprehend, I must do so by appealing to the iiifallil)ility of God and of Christ. But according to the logic of the objection this appeal would lie futile and the assent of faith considered as a rational act would be no firmer or more secure than natural human knowledge. The truth is that the inferential process here and in the case of ecclesiastical infalliliility transcends the rule of formal logic that is alleged. Assent is given not to the logical force of the syllogism, but directly to the authority which the inference serves to introduce; and this holds good in a measure even when there is question of mere fallililc authority. Once we come to believe in and rely upon authority we can afford to overlook the means by which we were brought to accept it, just as a man who has reached a solid standing place where he wishes to remain no longer relies on the frail latlder by which he mounted. It cannot be said that there is any es.sential difference in this respect between Divine and ecclesiastical infalliliility. The latter of course is only a means by which we are put under subjection to the former in regard to a body of truth once re- vealed and to l)e lielievod liy all men to the end of time, and no one can fairly deny that it is useful, not to say necessary, for that purpose. Its alternative is private judgment, and history has shown to what restilts this alternative inevitalily leads.
(:■!) Again, it is urged that the kind of submission demanded by infallilile authority is incompatible with the rights of reason and of legitimate inquirj' and speculation, and tends to give to one's faith in his Creed a dry, formal, proud, and intolerant character which contrasts unfavourably with the warm- hearted, humble, and tolerant faith of the man who
believes on conviction after free personal inquiry.
In reply it is sufficient to say that submission to in-
fallible authority implies no abdication of reason, nor
does it impose any undue cheek on the believer's free-
dom to pursue inquiry and speculation. Were it so,
how could one believe in revealed doctrine at all with-
out being accused, as unbelievers do accuse Christians,
of committing intellectual suicide? If one believes m
revelation at all one does so in deference to God's au-
thority, an authority that is surely infallible; and so
far as the principle of the objection is concerned there
is no difference between ecclesiastical and Divine in-
faUibility. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that
professing Christians should recur to such an argu-
ment, which, if consistently urged, would be fatal to
their own position. And as regards freedom of in-
quiry and speculation in reference to revealed doc-
trines themselves, it should be observed that true
freedom in this as in other matters does not mean un-
bridled licence. Really effective authoritative con-
trol is always necessarj' to prevent liberty from
degenerating into anarchy, and in the sphere of Chris-
tian doctrine — we are arguing only with those who
admit that Christ delivered a body of doctrine that
was to be held as eternally true — from the very nature
of the ca.se, the only effective barrier against Rational-
ism — the equivalent of political anarchy — is an in-
fallible ecclesiastical authority. This authority,
therefore, by its decisions merely curtails personal
freedom of inquiry in religious matters in the same
way, and by an equally valid title, as the supreme
authority in the State, restricts the hberty of private
citizens.
Moreover, as in a well ordered state there remains within the law a large margin for the exercise of per- sonal freetlom, so in the Church there is a very exten- sive domain which is given over to theological speculation; and even in regard to doctrines that have been infallibly defined there is always room for further inquiry so as the better to understand, explain, de- fend, and expand them. The only thing one may not do is to deny or change them. Then, in reply to the charge of intolerance, it may be said that if this be taken to mean an honest and sincere repudiation of Lilieralism and Rationalism, infalhbilists must plead guilty to the charge; but in doing so they are in good company. Christ Himself was intolerant in this sense; so were His Apostles; and so were all the great champions of historical Christianity in every age. Finally, it is altogether untrue, as every Catholic knows and feels, that faith which allows itself to be guided by infallible ecclesiastical authority is less in- timately personal or less genuine in any way than faith based on private judgment. If this tlocile loy- alty to Divine authority which true faith implies means anything, it means that one must listen to the voice of those whom God has expressly appointed to teach in His name, rather than to one's own private judgment deciding what God's teaching ought to be. For to this, in final analysis, the issue is reduced ; and he who chooses to make himself, instead of the au- thority which God has instituted, the final arbiter in matters of faith is far from possessing the true spirit of faith, which is the foundation of charity and of the whole supernatural life.
(4) .\gain, it is urged by our opponents that infallibil- ity as exercised by the Catholic Church has shown itself to be a failure, since, in the first place, it has not prevented schisms and heresies in the Christian body, and, in the second place, has not attempted to settle for Catholics themselves many important questions, the final settlement of which would be a great relief to believers by freeing them from anxious and distress- ing (loul)ts. In reply to the first point it is enough to say that the purpo.se for which Chri.st endowed the Church w-ith infallibility was not to prevent the occur- rence of schisms and heresies, which He foresaw and
