LABOUR
726
LABOUR
thus acting; for the employer's right to the continued
services of the brakemen is valid only so long as he
treats them reasonably, and does not use the advan-
tages which he derives from their services for unreason-
able ends. On the other hand, their obligation to
continue at work ceases when a reasonable cause
arises. Such a reasonable cause may well be at hand
when their continuation at work becomes a means of
assisting the employer in his unjust course towards the
trackmen, while their withdrawal from his service will
be effective in compelling him to do justice. Their
obligation towards their employer gives way before
their right morally to coerce him to grant justice to
their fellows. If, indeed, they should quit work with-
out any reasonable cause whatever, they would be
guilty of unreasonable interference with the employer's
right to pursue the advantages to be derived from the
railroad industry, but tlie cause of the unjustly treated
trackmen may be sufficient to render the interference
reasonable. It is on this principle that a strong na-
tion or a strong man is justified in coming to the
assistance of a weak nation or a weak man who is
oppressed by a nation or man with whom the assist-
ing power or person is at peace. When, however, the
.sympathetic strike is against another employer than
the one concerned in the original dispute, when, for
example, brickmakers quit work because their em-
ployer continues to furnish material to a builder
whose employees are on a strike, it will ordinarily be
contrary to both charity and justice. To be sure,
there are extreme cases in which the unconcerned em-
ployer would be under an obligation of charity to as-
sist the labourers who are involved in the first strike,
by ceasing to have business intercourse with the offend-
ing employer, but such cases would be of rare occur-
rence. Much rarer would be the situation in which a
sympathetic strike against employers generally would
be morally permissible. For the great body of em-
ployers and the general public are not reasonably
treated when they are compelled to suffer so great in-
convenience in order that an offending employer may
be coerced into reasonable treatment of a small sec-
tion of the community. While we cannot be certain
that a general strike is never justified, we can safely
say that there is against it an overwhelming presump-
tion.
B. The Boycott. — In general the boycott is a con- certed refusal to engage or continue in business or social intercourse with a person or corporation. Like the sympathetic strike, it is of two kinds, primary and secondary, or simple and compound. 'The primary boycott is carried on against a person with whom the boycotters have had a dispute ; the secondary against some person who refuses to join in the primary boy- cott. The morality of the primary boycott depends upon the grievance that the boycotters have against the boycotted, and the extent to which, and the means by which it is prosecuted. If the labourers have not been unfairly treated by the person with whom they are at variance, they commit injustice when they or- ganize and carry on a boycott against him. It is true, indeed, that the employer or business man has no absolute right, nor any property right, to the patron- age of his employees. The same principle applies to the merchant and his customers. Nevertheless both have a right that is valid as long as it is not forfeited by unreasonable conduct. The basis of this right is the same far-reaching principle that we noticed in con- nexion with the right of a man to his job, and of an un- concerned employer to the services of his employees who threaten to make him the victim of a secondary sympathetic strike. It is the principle that every man has the right to seek and obtain material goods and opportunities on reasonable terms, and without unreasonable interference. Indeed, this is the real basis of even property rights, and the sole final justifi- cation of all the recognized property titles. Hence it
is a violation of justice to deprive a man of the bene-
fits of social or business intercourse without some
suiBcient reason. But there can be a sufficient rea-
son. It will be present when the injustice inflicted by
the employer is grave, and when no milder method
will be effective. To deny this would be to maintain
that the employer has a right to pursue his advantage
in an unreasonable way, and immune from reasonable
interference. The labourers are endowed with the
same right of seeking material benefits on reasonable
conditions and by reasonable methods; in this case the
boycott is a reasonable method. After all, the boy-
cott does not differ essentially from the strike, which
is also a concerted refusal of intercourse. But the
boycott must be kept within the limits of justice and
charity in its process and extent. It must be free
from violence and other inmioral circmnstances, and
it must not be carried so far as to deny to its object the
necessaries of life, or any of those acts of social in-
tercourse which are demanded by the fundamental
human relations, — what the theologians call the " com-
munia signa charitatis". For the sake of clearness
and simplicity, the foregoing observations refer only to
cases in which a boycotted employer is treating his
employees unfairly; but it is obvious that lawful boy-
cotts have a much wider application. When the cause
and the need are sufficiently grave, the boycott may be
employed with due moderation against any unreason-
able conduct that inflicts harm, material, moral, or
religious, upon a section of the community. Witness
the boycotting of perverse newspapers and theatres.
The secondary boycott is directed, as already noted, against "innocent third persons", that is, those per- sons who refuse to assist in the primary boycott. For example, the labourers refuse to buy from a merchant who wUl not discontinue his patronage of a manufac- turer against whom they have a grievance. In princi- ple it is the same as the secondary sympathetic strike, and in practice it is likewise immoral except in ex- treme cases. It is ordinarily immoral because it is an unreasonable interference with the right of the uncon- cerned person to pursue and possess the advantages of social or business intercourse with his fellows, that is, with the person who is originally boycotted and the boycotters themselves. It is an unreasonable inter- ference because it subjects him to what is in most cases an unreasonable inconvenience, that is, the depriva- tion of intercourse with either the boycotted or the boycotters. This inconvenience is unreasonable be- cause it is excessive as compared w'ith the moral claims of the boycotters to the co-operation of the man who is compelled to suffer the inconvenience. That the former have a right to bestow their patronage where they please, is true as a general proposition, but the proposition is too general to reflect adequately the equities of the situation. Undoubtedly the labourers, or any other class of persons, are within their rights and exempt from moral censure when they transfer their patronage to some person whom they wish to favour; in the secondary boycott, however — and in the primary as well — the desire to help a friend is only incidental, while the intention to injure the boycotted person is direct and jiriiiuiry. This is not morally lawful unless the thing (liat they seek to compel him to do can be reasonalily required of him. For exam- ple, when labourers withdraw their trade from a mer- chant because he refuses to refrain, at great financial loss, from patronizing a manufacturer who, W'c will suppose, is justly boycotted by the labourers and their friends, he is compelled to undergo a loss that is out of proportion to his duty of assisting the latter. His right to business intercourse on reasonable terms is violated.
On the other hand, cases do occur in which an un- concerned person may reasonalily be re(|uired to give up the advantages of business relations with the man against whom the primary boycott is directed; if be
