LAW
77
LAW
of an movement and action. When God willed to
nve existence to creatures, He willed to ordain and
direct them to an end. In the case of inanimate
things, this Divine direction is provided for in the
nature which God has given to each; in them deter-
minism reigns. Like all the rest of creation, man is
destined by God to an end, and receives from Him a
direction towards this end. This ordination is of a
character in harmony with his free intelligent natiu^.
In virtue of his intelligence and free will, man is
master of his conduct. Unlike the things of the
mere material world he can vary his action, act, or
abstain from action, as he pleases. Yet he is not a
lawless being in an ordered universe. In the very
constitution of his nature, he too has a law laid down
for him, reflecting that ordination and direction of
all things, which is the eternal law. The rule, then,
which Uod has prescribed for our conduct, is found
in our nature itself. Those actions which conform
with its tendencies, lead to our destined end, and are
thereby constituted right and morally good; those
at variance with oin: nature are wrong and immoral.
The norm, however, of conduct is not some partic- ular element or aspect of our nature. The standard Is our whole human nature with its manifold re- lationships, considered as a creature destined to a special end. Actions are wrong if, though subserving tne satisfaction of some particular need or tendency, they are at the same tune incompatible with that rational harmonious subordination of the lower to the higher which reason should maintain among our conflicting tendencies and desires (see Good). For example, to nourish our bodies is rightj but to in- dulge our appetite for food to the oetnment of our corporal or spiritual life is wrong. Self-preservation is nght, but to refuse to expose our life when the well-oeing of society requires it, is wrong. It is wrong to drink to intoxication, for, besides being in- jurious to health, such indulgence deprives one of the use of reason, which is intended by God to be the guide and dictator of conduct. Theft is wrong, be- cause it subverts the basis of social life; and man's nature requires for its proper development that he Uve in a state of society. There is, then, a double reason for calling this law of conduct natural: first, because it is set up concretely in our very nature it- self, and second, bBcause it is manifested to us by the piirely natural medium of reason. In both respects it is distinguished from the Divine positive law, which contains precepts not arising from the nature of things as God has constituted them by the creative act, but from the arbitrary will of Goa. This law we learn, not through the unaided operation of reason, but through the light of supernatural revelation.
We may now analyse the natural law into three constitutents: the discriminating norm, the binding norm (norma obligans), and the manifesting norm. The discriminating norm is, as we have just seen, human nature itself, objectively considered. It is, 80 to speak, the book in which is written the text of the law, and the classification of human actions into good and bad. Strictly speaking, our nature is the proximate discriminating norm or standard. The remote and ultimate norm, of which it is the par- tial reflection and application, is the Divine nature itself, the ultimate groundwork of the created order. The binding or obligatory norm is the Divine author- ity, imposing upon the rational creature the obliga- tion of living in conformity with his nature, and thus with the imiversal order established by the Creator. Contrarv to the Kantian theory that we must not acknowledge any other lawgiver than conscience, the truth is tlSit reason as conscience is only immediate moral authority^ which we are called upon to obey, and conscience itself owes its authoritv to the fact that it IB the mouthpiece of the Divine will and iynperium. The manifesting norm (norma denuntians), which
determines the moral quality of actions tried by the
discriminating norm, is reason. Through this faculty
we perceive what is the moral constitution of our
nature, what kind of action it calls for, and whether
a particular action possesses this requisite character,
ll. The Contents of the Natural Law. — Radi- cally, the natural law consists of one supreme and uni- versal principle, from which are derived all our natural moral obligations or duties. We cannot discuss here the many erroneous opinions regarding the fimdamen- tal rule of life. Some of them are utterly false — for instance, that of Bentham, who made the pursuit of utilitv or temporal pleasure the foundation of the moral code, and that of Fichte, who taught that the supreme obligation is to love self above everything and all others on account of self. Others present the true idea in an imperfect or one-sided fashion. Epicurus, for example, held the supreme principle to be, " Follow nature"; the Stoics inculcated living according to reason. But these philosophers interpreted their prin- ciples in a manner less in conformity with our doctrine than the tenor of their words suggests. Catholic moralists, though agreeing upon the imderlying con- ception of the Natural Law, have differed more or less in their expression of its ftmdamental formulae. Among many others we find the following: *' Love God as the end and everything on account of Him"; "live con- formably to human nature considered in all its essen- tial respects"; "Observe the rational order estab- lished and sanctioned by God "; " Manifest in your life the image of God impressed on your rational nature." The exposition of St. Thomas is at once the most sim- ple and philosophic. Starting from the premise that good is what pnmarily falls under the apprehension of the practical reason — that is of reason acting as the dictator of conduct — and that, consequently, the su- preme principle of moral action must nave the good as its central idea, he holds that the supreme principle, from which all the other principles and precepts are derived, is that good is to be done, and evil avoided (I-II, Q. xciv,a. 2).
Passing from the primary principle to the subor- dinate principles and conclusions, moralists divide these into two classes: (I) those dictates of reason which flow so directly from the primary principle that they hold in practical reason the same place as evident propositions in the speculative sphere, or are at least easily deducible from the primary principle. Such, for instance, are: "Adore God"; "Honour your par- ents"; "Do not steal"; (2) those other conclusions and precepts which are reached only through a more or less complex course of inference. It is this diffi- culty and uncertainty that requires the natural law to be supplemented by positive law, human and Di- vine. As regards the vigour and binding force of these precepts ana conclusions, theologians divide them into two classes, primary and secondary. To the first class belong those which must, under all circumstances, be observed if the essential moral order is to be main- tained. The secondary precepts are those whose observance contributes to the public and private good and is required for the perfection of moral develop- ment, but is not so absolutely necessary to the ratioi^- ality of conduct that it may not be lawfully omitted under some special conditions. For example, imder no circumstances is polyandry compatible with the moral order, while polygamy, though mconsistent with human relations m their proper moral and social development, is not absolutely incompatible with them imder less civilized conditions.
II. The Qualities of the Natural LAW.-;-(a) The natural law is universal, that is to say, it applies to the entire human race, and is in itself the same for all. Every man, because he is a man, is bound, if he will confortn t^ the universal order willed by the Creator, to live conformably to his own rational nature, and to be guided by his reason. However, infants and in-
