ULW 55 LAW
the deetructioQ of all religion, which in its essence rests tions. This conoept originally arose only in regard to
upon the subjection of the creature to his Creator. actions which were quickly followed by external pun-
The adherents of the Kantian autonomy can also ishments. Gradually, by association of ideas, it was be asked whether man binds himself of necessity or also connected with other actions imtil then per- voluntarily? If voluntarilyi then he can at any formed or avoided purely on account of their natural moment annul this obligation; conseauently, in a consequences. Through evolution, howaver, he goes practical sense, no obligation exists. If of necessity, on to say, the idea of compulsion, owing only to con- the question arises whence comes this necessiW to fusion or false generalization, tends to disappear and bind oneself unconditionally? To this question Kant eventually is found only in rare cases. Spencer has no answer to give. He refers us to an undemon- claimed to have found, even to-day, here ana there strable and incomprehensible necessity. He says: men who regularly*do good and avoid evU without any
- 'A11 human reason is incapable of explaining how idea of compulsion. Most modern writers on ethics, who
pure reason may be practical (imposing obligation), do not holcl to a positive Christian point of view, adopt . . . Thus, it is true, we do not comprehend the prac- these Spencerian ideas, e. g. Laas, von Gizycki, Paul- tical, unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative, sen, Leslie, Fouill^, and many ot)}ers. Spencer and but we do, however, comprehend its incomprenensibil- his followers are nevertheless wrong, for their explana- ity, which is all that can, m fairness, be demanded from tion of duty rests on entirely imtenable premises. It a philosophy that seeks to reach the principles which presupposes that the animal has already a conscience, mark the limit of human reason [/'Grundleg. zur that man does not differ essentially from the animal, Metaphys. der Sitten", ed. Hartenst«in, IV (1838), that he has gradually developed from a form of ani- 91-93]. Kant, who without hesitation sets aside sil mal, that he possesses no essentially higher spiritual Christian mysteries, in this way imposes upon us in powers, etc. Moreover, their explanation of duty is philosophy a mystery of his own invention. Kant's meaningless. No one will assert of a man that he acts views contain a germ of truth, which, however, they from duty if he abstains from certain actions through distort until it can no longer be recognized. In order fear of police penalties, or the anger of his fellow-men. that a human law may be obligatory upon us we must Besides, what is the meaning of an obligation that is have in ourselves from the beginninjz the conviction only an accidental product of evolution, destined to that we are to do good and avoid evil, that we are to disappear with the progress of the latter, and for dis- obey rightful authority, etc. But the further ques- regarding which we are responsible to no superior? tion now arises, whence do we receive this conviction? In contiast with these modern and untenable hv- From God, our Creator. Just as our whole being is an potheses the Christian theistic conception of the world image of Grod, so also is our reason with its powers and explained long since the origin and nature of duty in a inborn tendencies an image of the Divine Reason, and fully satisfactory manner. From eternity there was our cognitions which we involuntarily form in con- present to the Spirit of God the plan of the govern- sequence of natural tendency are a participation in ment of the world which He had resolved to create, the Divine wisdom, — are, it may be said, a streaming This plan of government is the eternal law (lex aterna) in of the Divine light into the created reason. This is, according to which God guides all things towards their indeed, not to be so understood as though we had in- final goal: the jglorifying of God and the eternal happi- nate ideas, but rather that the ability and inclination ness of mankind. But the Creator does not move are inborn in us by virtue of which we spontaneously creatures, as men do, simply by external force, by form universal concepts and principles, both in the pressure, or impact, and the like, but h}r tendencies theoretical and practical order, and easily discern that and impulses which He has implanted in creatures in these practic^ed principles the will of the Supreme and, what is more, in each one according to itis indi- Director of all things manifests itself. • vidual nature. He guides irrational creatures by
The Kantian philosophy has now but few adherents; blind impulses, inclimitions, or instincts. He can- most champions of independent ethics seek to explain the origin of duty by experience and development.
Typical of writers on ethics of this school are the which in the act of creation He im{)l
opinions of Herbert Spencer. This philosopher of man heart. As soon as man attains to the use of
evolution believed that he had discovered already in reason he forms, as already indicated, on account of
animals, principally in dogs, evidences of conscience, innate predispositions and tendencies, the most gen-
especially the beginnings of the consciousness of dut^, eral moral principles, e. g. that man is to do good and
the idea of obligation. This consciousness of duty is avoid evil, that man is to commit no injustice, etc.
further developed in men by the accumulation of ex- He also easily understands that these commands do
periences and inheritance. Duty presents itself to us not depend on his own volition but express the will of
as a restraint of our actions. There are, however, se v^ a higher power, which regulates and guides all things,
eral varieties of such restraints. The inner restraint is By these commands (the natural moral law) man
developed by induction, inasmuch as we discern by re- shares in a rational manner in the eternal law; they
peated experience that certain actions have useful, are the temporal expression of the eternal, Divine law.
others injurious results. In this way we are attracted The natural moral law is also the foundation and root
to the one, uid frightened away from the other, of the obligation of all positive laws. We recognize
Added to this is the external restraint, the fear of evil that we cannot violate the natural moral law, and the
results or punishments which threaten us from with- positive laws that are rooted in it, without acting in
out and are threefold in form. In the earliest stageis opposition to the will of God, rebelling against our
of development man has to abstain from actions Creator and highest Master, offending Him, turning
through fear qf the anger of uncivilized associates away from our final end, and incurrmg the Divine
(social sanction). , At a nigher stage man must avoid judgment. Thus man feels himself to be always and
many actions, because such would be punished by a ever^nvhere bound, without losing his freedom in a
powerful and bold associate who has succeeded in physical sense, to the order appomted him by God.
making himself chief (state sanction). Finally, we He can do evil but he ought not. If of his own will he
have in addition the fear of the spirits of the dead, es- violates God's law he brings guilt upon himself and
pecially of the dead chiefs, who, it was believed, lin- deserves punishment in the eyes of the all-wise, all-
gered near and still inflicted punishment upon many holy, and absolutely just God. Obligation is this ne-
actions displeasing to them (religious sanction), llie cessity, arising from this knowledge, for the human
external restraint, L e. the fear of punishment, created will to do good and avoid evil. in mankind, as yet little developed, the concept of III. Classification of Laws. — A. The actual, di-
eompcilsUm, df obligation in relation to certain ac- rect effect of law is obligation. According to the
