Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge
INTRODUCTORY.
The terms " Akt," " Inhalt " and " Gep^enstand " are the keywords of a
certain theory of knowledge which constitutes, in my opinion, the most
important recent development of philosophical thought in Germany.
L^Among its leading representatives I may refer to Me ino ng, Husserl
and Lipps, Kiilpe and Messer. In spite of manifold divergences
in detail, these writers agree in adopting a certain fundamental
scheme as expressing the fundamental nature of mental life and
mental development. They agree in sharply distinguishing between
what the mind means or intends in perceiving, thinking, or having
ideas, and the actual experiences or " Erlebnisse " which belong to its
own particular existence as a psychical individual. What t he mind
means or intend s is called by them an object or " Gegenstajxd-" The
meaning or intending of something as distinguished from what is
meant or intended is called by them an ' ^Akt." An act is a mode of
being conscious, and is therefore an actual experience or " Erlebnis s "
forming part of the existence of the iildividual mind. But it is
an experience which has the distinctive character of intending or •
being or directed towards an object. Hence it is often described ,
as " intentional " experience. Inasmuch as there are various modes
of being conscious in relation to objects, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish different qualities of intentional experience. In this way
mere supposing is distinguished from believing, and both from-
desiring or willing. But whether we merely suppose or believe or
desire or will, the acts of supposing, believing, desiring, or willing are
essentially relative to something other than themselves which is
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