(81 × 93)/(19 × 7) or 81/19 × 93/7,
or the product of the chances of each singly yielding a true answer.
It will be seen that a chance is a quantity which may have any magnitude, however great. An event in whose favor there is an even chance, or 1/1, has a probability of 1/2. An argument having an even chance can do nothing toward re-*enforcing others, since according to the rule its combination with another would only multiply the chance of the latter by 1.
Probability and chance undoubtedly belong primarily to consequences, and are relative to premises; but we may, nevertheless, speak of the chance of an event absolutely, meaning by that the chance of the combination of all arguments in reference to it which exist for us in the given state of our knowledge. Taken in this sense it is incontestable that the chance of an event has an intimate connection with the degree of our belief in it. Belief is certainly something more than a mere feeling; yet there is a feeling of believing, and this feeling does and ought to vary with the chance of the thing believed, as deduced from all the arguments. Any quantity which varies with the chance might, therefore, it would seem, serve as a thermometer for the proper intensity of belief. Among all such quantities there is one which is peculiarly appropriate. When there is a very great chance, the feeling of belief ought to be very intense. Absolute certainty, or an infinite chance, can never be attained by mortals, and this may be represented appropriately by an infinite belief. As the chance diminishes the feeling of
