be true; we only surmise that it may be so. But there is no difference except one of degree between such an inference and that by which we are led to believe that we remember the occurrences of yesterday from our feeling as if we did so.
II
Besides the way just pointed out of inverting a deductive syllogism to produce an induction or hypothesis, there is another. If from the truth of a certain premise the truth of a certain conclusion would necessarily follow, then from the falsity of the conclusion the falsity of the premise would follow. Thus, take the following syllogism in Barbara:
Rule.—All men are mortal.
Case.—Enoch and Elijah were men.
Result.—Enoch and Elijah were mortal.
Now, a person who denies this result may admit the rule,
and, in that case, he must deny the case. Thus:
Denial of Result.—Enoch and Elijah were not mortal.
Rule.—All men are mortal.
Denial of Case.—Enoch and Elijah were not men.
This kind of syllogism is called Baroco, which is the typical
mood of the second figure. On the other hand, the
person who denies the result may admit the case, and in
that case he must deny the rule. Thus:
Denial of the Result.—Enoch and Elijah were not
mortal.
Case.—Enoch and Elijah were men.
Denial of the Rule.—Some men are not mortal.
