7. "What Pragmatism Is?" Vol. 15, pp. 161-181.
8. "The Issues of Pragmaticism," Vol. 15, pp. 481-499.
9. "Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion," Vol. 16, pp. 147ff.
10. "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," Vol. 16, pp. 492-546.
The last four papers develop Peirce's thought by showing its agreement
and disagreement with the pragmatism of James and Schiller. The last
paper contains his Method of Existential Graphs.
E. "The Reality of God," in the Hibbert Journal, Vol. 7 (1908),
pp. 96-112. (This article contains brief indications of many
of Peirce's leading ideas.)
F. Six Papers in the Open Court, Vols. 6-7 (1893).
1. "Pythagorics" (on the Pythagorean brotherhood), pp.
3375-3377.
2. "Dmesis" (on charity towards criminals), pp. 3399-3402.
3. "The Critic of Arguments (I.), Exact Thinking," pp. 3391-3394.
4. "The Critic of Arguments (II.), The Reader is Introduced to Relatives," pp. 3415-3419. (The last two contain a very clear succinct account of the general character of Peirce's logic.)
5. "What is Christian Faith?" pp. 3743-3745.
6. "The Marriage of Religion and Science," pp. 3559-3560.
G. Articles in Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy": Individual,
kind, matter and form, possibility, pragmatism, priority,
reasoning, sign, scientific method, sufficient reason, synechism,
and uniformity.
H. "Pearson's Grammar of Science," in Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 58 (1901), pp. 296-306. (A critique of Pearson's conceptualism and of his utilitarian view as to the aim of science.)
II. Writings of Predominantly Logical Interest.
A. Five Papers on Logic, read before the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences. Published in the Proceedings of the Academy, Vol. 7 (1867).
1. "On an Improvement in Boole's Calculus of Logic," pp.
250-261. (Suggests improvements in Boole's logic, especially
in the representation of particular propositions.
The association of probability with the notion of relative
frequency became a leading idea of Peirce's
thought.)
2. "On the Natural Classification of Arguments," pp. 261-287. (A suggestive distinction between the leading principle and the premise of an argument. Contains also an interesting note (pp. 283-284) denying the posi-
