now, therefore, divided into two parts: one in the interior, which desired Buenos Ay res for the capital of the union; the other in Buenos Ayres, which made a pretense of not wishing this city to be the capital, that it might separate itself from European civilization and civil order.
Another fact had been disclosed by this battle, namely, that the Montonera had lost its primitive strength, and that civilized armies could compete with it successfully. It is a significant fact in Argentine history, that, as time passes, the pastoral bands lose their early vigor. Facundo was already obliged to spur them on with terror, and they were but a dull, disorderly set, opposed to troops disciplined and guided by rules of strategy and art. In Buenos Ayres, however, the result was different. Lavalle, notwithstanding his bravery, which had been sufficiently proved at Puente Marquez, and his large number of regular troops, yielded at the end of the campaign, shut up as he was in the city by thousands of gauchos collected by Rosas and Lopez. By a treaty which was to all purpose a capitulation, he gave up his authority, and Rosas entered Buenos Ayres. I believe that only through an unfortunate mistake of his, Lavalle lost the victory. He had been famous for the success of his cavalry charges; at the defeat of Toreta or Moquegua, I do not remember which, Lavalle made forty charges during the day to protect the retreating army, and I doubt if the cavalry of Murat ever did as much. But unfortunately, Lavalle, remembering in 1839 that the Montenera had conquered him in 1830, abandoned his military education and adopted the Montonera system.
