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THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS
115

Hugh Rose showed his capacity as a commander by disregarding fixed rules of war, when to observe them would be mere pedantry. Had his example been followed more generally in other parts of India much time and many lives might have been saved. He had recourse to a mode of attack which under ordinary circumstances would not have been justifiable. In order to enfilade the city wall, he disconnected and separated his two attacks; while to make up for deficiencies in siege artillery, he brought up nine and six-pounder guns to fire on the enemy's defences. At the same time, wishing to invest the place as completely as possible with his small force, he established seven flying camps of cavalry and horse artillery, posting native artillery and infantry at the principal camps. These flying camps sent out patrols to a considerable distance in every direction, in order to prevent the rebels either leaving or entering the beleaguered city. Abattis and deep trenches were dug across the roads and tracks. Each camp, on any attempt being made to force its line, had orders to call to its aid the neighbouring camps. An observatory[1] and telegraph-post, in charge of an officer and two non-commissioned officers, was established; and from here, with the aid of a telescope — the best that could be got — the besiegers could see right into the interior of the city.

  1. It was fortunate this precaution was taken. On the evening of March 31st, flags were flying from it, indicating that Tántia Topi was coming in great force from the north to relieve the city.