with other annotations similarly allow the Commission to direct the inclusion of new material. Indeed, the very first section of the agreement states that the OCGA shall include, in addition to the various, specified annotations, “other material related to or included in such Code at the direction of the Commission.”
Finally, the publication agreement describes in detail how the Commission is to give its final assent to the annotations. First, as for each type of annotation, the agreement affirms the Commission’s role in approving Lexis’s work. Thus, with respect to the summaries of judicial opinions, the agreement provides that “the form of the annotations shall be subject to the approval of the Commission.” The agreement contains similar provisions with respect to the other annotations. More generally, the agreement provides that the “ultimate right of editorial control over all material contained in the Code shall be in the Commission, and in the event of any disagreement between the Commission and the Publisher over the material to be included, the decision of the Commission shall control.” A separate provision of the agreement similarly provides that in the event of any disagreement “the Commission shall prevail.” Moreover, the agreement requires that the Commission have an opportunity to conduct pre-publication review of all subsequent supplements, replacement volumes, and other updates to the OCGA.
In short, the Commission exercises direct, authoritative control over the creation of the OCGA annotations at every stage of their preparation. The Commission provides initial instructions to Lexis, directly supervises Lexis’s work throughout the preparation process, and must give its final editorial assent to the annotations before they can become part of the OCGA. In this way, the Commission undeniably controls the creation of the OCGA annotations.
The Commission’s intimate involvement in the creation of the annotations is of great significance. This is because a close examination of the nature of the Commission confirms that it is for all intents and purposes an arm of the Georgia General Assembly. As we’ve noted, the Commission is composed of fifteen members, nine of whom are sitting members of the Georgia General Assembly, along with the Lieutenant Governor of the State. Further, funding for the Commission comes directly from appropriations “provided for the legislative branch of state government.” O.C.G.A. § 28-9-2. In addition, Georgia law provides that “[t]he Office of Legislative Counsel shall serve as staff for the commission.” O.C.G.A. § 28-9-4. This is notable because, under Georgia law, the Office of Legislative Counsel is tasked with providing various advisory and legal services “for the legislative branch of government” and is therefore properly seen as an adjunct to the General Assembly. O.C.G.A. § 28-4-3. Thus, not only is the Commission funded by legislative branch appropriations, but its staff is drawn from an office that is itself an agency of the Georgia General Assembly.
Further confirming the Commission’s deep connection to the Georgia General Assembly, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that the Commission’s work is properly characterized as “legislative” in nature, and that it is therefore proper for the Commission to be largely composed of officials from the legislative branch. Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm’n, 244 Ga. 325, 260 S.E.2d 30 (1979). Thus, in light of how it is funded and staffed, and since its work is legislative in nature, it is abundantly clear that the Commission is a creation and an agent of the Georgia General Assembly.
Indeed, the connection between the Commission and the elected leg-
