deſign and end of government, viz. Freedom and Security. And however our eyes may be dazzled with ſhow, or our ears deceived by ſound; however prejudice may warp our wills, or intereſt darken our underſtanding, the ſimple voice of nature and reaſon will ſay, 'tis right.
I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature which no art can overturn, viz. that the more ſimple any thing is, the leſs liable it is to be diſordered, and the eaſier repaired when diſordered; and with this maxim in view I offer a few remarks on the ſo much boaſted conſtitution of England. That it was noble for the dark and ſlaviſh times in which it was erected, is granted. When the world was over-run with tyranny, the leaſt remove therefrom was a glorious reſcue. But that it is imperfect, ſubject to convulſions, and incapable of producing what it ſeems to promiſe, is eaſily demonſtrated.
Abſolute governments (though the diſgrace of human nature) have this advantage with them, that they are ſimple; if the people ſuffer, they know the head from which their ſuffering ſprings; know likewiſe the remedy; and are not bewildered by a variety of cauſes and cures. But the conſtitution of England is ſo exceedingly complex, that the nation may ſuffer for years together, without being able to diſcover in which part the fault lies; ſome will ſay in one and ſome in another, and every political phyſician will adviſe a different medicine.
I know it is difficult to get over local or long-ſtanding prejudices, yet if we will ſuffer ourſelves to examine the component parts of the Engliſh conſtitution, we ſhall find them to be the baſe remains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with ſome new Republican materials.
Firſt.—The remains of Monarchical tyranny, in the perſon of the King.
Secondly.—The remains of Ariſtocratical tyranny, in the perſons of the Peers.
Thirdly.—The new Republican materials, in the perſons of the Commons, on whoſe virtue depends the freedom of England.
The two firſt, by being hereditary, are independent of the people; wherefore in a conſtitutional ſenſe they contribute nothing towards the freedom of the ſtate.
To ſay that the conſtitution of England is a union of three powers, reciprocally checking each other, is farcical; either the words have no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.
To ſay that the Commons is a check upon the King, preſuppoſes two things:
Firſt.—That the King is not to be truſted without being looked after, or, in other words, that a thirſt for abſolute power is the natural diſeaſe of Monarchy.
Secondly.—That the Commons, by being appointed for that purpoſe, are either wiſer or more worthy of confidence than the Crown.
But as the ſame conſtitution which gives the Commons a power to check the King, by with-holding the ſupplies, gives afterwards the King a power to check
