for the recent signal mark of his favor. It would be a hazardous and costly experiment, an act of robbery, and even if successful, would disturb the repose of the country, now rapidly developing under the happy auspices of peace. Jefferson was unwilling to resort to a policy of war, and he was right. Adhering to the wise maxim of Washington to avoid entangling alliances with foreign nations, he continued the policy which had been so successful in winning Louisiana—peaceful negotiation. That the way was unexpectedly beset with obstacles, was no fault of Jefferson’s. No human prescience could foresee the approaching insanity of Europe. Through the remainder of his administration, Jefferson appears in the light of a man in perfect possession of his senses, endeavoring to avoid a free fight with a party of madmen whom he tries to conciliate, waiting for their return to a lucid interval.
To paint a picture of this period of European insanity, robbery and piracy, would require a lengthened treatise. Our space permits only a glance at the relations of the United States with the several European powers at the time when negotiations were in progress.
Spain was irritated and sore at the loss of Louisiana, and had yielded possession under constraint.
Napoleon was lukewarm. He was disappointed at the apparent indifference with which the United States had received what he esteemed a signal mark of his favor, and had evaded participation in European contests. America, however, was beyond his reach. He could use no direct coercion, and could only strive to involve her in hostility with his enemies.
Great Britain had shown marked dissatisfaction with the retrocession of Louisiana to France. The Addington ministry had maintained friendly relations with the United States, and had expressed sentiments favorable to the efforts of the American commissioners to secure the Mississippi as the national boundary. Confident in
