the restraints of decency covering such obvious distrust, dissatisfaction, and dislike. Davis was always the more diplomatic. Further, I think he shows a deeper sense of the immense interests involved and the necessity of making sacrifices for them than Johnston does. Indeed, for a long time he was ready to meet Johnston halfway, if Johnston would have gone his half. Even after their preliminary squabble about rank, so late as June, 1862, at the time of Johnston's wound, the president writes: "General J. E. Johnston is steadily improving. I wish he were able to take the field. Despite the critics, who know military affairs by instinct, he is a good soldier, never brags of what he did do, and could at this time render most valuable service."42 Much later still, real, almost pathetic kindness is mingled with reproof and recrimination: "I assure you that nothing shall be wanting on the part of the Government to aid you in your effort to regain possession of the territory from which we have been driven. ... It is my desire that you should communicate fully and freely with me concerning your plan of action, that all the assistance and cooperation may be most advantageously afforded that it is in the power of the Government to render." 43
As for Johnston, he is the military subordinate of this personal enemy of his. He knows his duty. He will be submissive, he will be obedient, he will be respectful, if it costs his own ruin and his country's. The study of his efforts is painfully interesting. Before the rupture had
