Magna Carta, and the Constitution of U.S., 7.
Member, the new, embarrassments of, in the House, 61 et seq.
Members, suppression of independence and ability amongst, in the House, by the Rules, 110.
Membership, of Senate, made up by promotions from House, 210; of Senate, biennially renewed in part, 228, 229.
Ministry, parliamentary debate centres around British, 95; disintegrate, in Congress, 102; parliamentary position of British, 95, 244; British, a single Standing Committee of Parliament, 117; necessity of public debate to British, 119; British, compared with French, 123, 124, 129; history of parliamentary responsibility of British, 286-288.
“Morning hours,” 73.
Nation, the, letter to, on federal financial system, quoted, 191; on status of Cabinet, quoted, 269.
National sovereignty, growth of sentiment of, 31, 32; sentiment of, makes advent and issue of the war inevitable, 32.
Newcastle, Duke of, 236.
Nominations, the Senate and, 235; popular interest attaching to action of Senate on, 236, 237; of Presidents by conventions, virtual character of, 245.
Northcote, Sir Stafford, 322
Orators, character of the ruling, of our race, 208 et seq.; natural leaders of a self-governing people, 209; Froude on political, 215; political, without authority or responsibility in U.S., 319 et seq.; political weight of, in England, 321-324.
Otis, James, 209.
Parties, vagueness of responsibility of, for legislation in U.S., 96-101; both, represented on Standing Committees, 99; in U.S., absence of responsible organization in, 187; in U.S., headless, conglomerate character of, 324; in Congress, discipline of, 326, 327; in Congress, kept together by caucus, 330.
Party, govt. by, practical necessity for, 97 et seq.; organization, outside Congress, 98; inside Congress, 99; choice of Speaker by, 107; govt. by, perfected in British system, 117 et seq.; diversity between Executive and Congress, 267; conditions of govt. by, 267, 268; relations of President and Cabinet, 269; insignificance of Cabinet, 270; leaders in England, weight and position of, 322.
Power, diffusion of, in Congress, 92, 206; irresponsible, 92, 93, 314; and accountability, 283, 284.
Presidency, tendency to raise governors of States to the, 253.
President, the, and Supreme Court, relations between, 35; independence and influence of, 41; declining prestige of office of, 43; belittled by growth of congressional power, 43; and Cabinet, division of labor between, 45, 46; veto power of, 52, 260; and Senate, no real consultation between, 232 et seq.; irresponsible dictation of Senate to, 238, 239; functional contrast of, with English Prime Minister, 249; conditions surrounding choice of a, by convention, 250, 251; character of usual functions of, 254; not all of the Executive, 257; relations of, to Cabinet, 258, 259; De Tocqueville on position of, 266, n.; party relations of, 269; party insignificance of, 270; and Congress, defective means of coöperation between, 270, 271.
